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Abstract 
The notion of software code replacing legal code as a mechanism to control human behavior – 
‘code as law’ – is often illustrated with examples in intellectual property and freedom of speech. 
This article examines the neglected issue of the impact of ‘code as law’ on privacy. To what extent 
is privacy-related ‘code’ being used, either to undermine or to enhance privacy? On the basis of 
cases in the domains of law enforcement, national security, E-government, and commerce, it is 
concluded that technology rarely incorporates specific privacy-related norms. At the same time, 
however, technology very often does have clear effects on privacy, as it affects the ‘reasonable 
expectation of privacy’. Technology usually makes privacy violations easier. Particularly 
information technology is much more a technology of control than it is a technology of freedom. 
Privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) have yet to be implemented on any serious scale. The 
consequent eroding effect of technology on privacy is a slow, hardly perceptible process. If one is 
to stop this almost natural process, a concerted effort is called for, possibly in the form of ‘privacy 
impact assessments’, enhanced control mechanisms, and awareness-raising. 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Panoptic Panoramas 
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham, the English utilitarian philosopher, worried over the moral state of his 
times, and he devised an architectural design for a prison that he called the Panopticon. This 
Panopticon has stood model for a kind of ultimate surveillance ever since, and is hence connected 
to the concept of privacy. The Panopticon is a hemispherical building. On the outer perimeter 
there are a number of levels, each containing cells for the inmates. The individual cells are 
completely isolated from each other, making it impossible for the inmates to see or hear the other 
prisoners. In the middle of the Panopticon is the office of the Inspector. The inspector can see and 
hear every individual prisoner, but the prisoners can not see the Inspector. One can imagine that 
this requires complicated structures, and one can even doubt whether it could have been 
constructed in Bentham’s times at all.  
The principal idea of the Panopticon is that inmates are under potential scrutiny of the Inspector 
at all times. The Inspector has the capacity to see and hear all inmates and issue commands to 
them individually, day and night. Not so much the fact that the Inspector can issue commands and 
monitor the inmates is the strength of the Panopticon, but the illusion that he could. As the point 
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2of the Panopticon is discipline or training,2 the constant illusion of monitoring and the fear 
inmates feel of punishment for transgressions makes that they will learn the rules quickly and 
behave accordingly. That, at least, is the idea.  
In Bentham’s view, the idea of the Panopticon could not only be used as a model for prisons, but 
also for asylums, workplaces, and schools, to name but a few areas. Bentham carried a social 
mission to improve society, and seeing without being seen plays an important role in 
accomplishing this goal. 
Not surprisingly, the Panopticon has become a metaphor for total surveillance. And whereas the 
actual implementation of the Panopticon was not very realistic in Bentham’s times, it is nowadays 
becoming increasingly so. Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) cameras are appearing everywhere, in both 
private and public places. And although increasingly these cameras are operated by private 
enterprises, many are state-controlled. They are often placed more or less with Benthamite goals 
in mind, such as the increase of public safety (‘Big brother is watching out for you’ instead of 
‘Big brother is watching you’3 and increased compliance with speed regulations. And, completely 
in line with panoptic logic, there may actually not be anyone watching the shots taken by the 
cameras or they may lack film. It is the possibility of being caught that is part of their effect. The 
illusion of an omnipresent inspector is there to keep the subjects in line. 
The internet offers excellent opportunities for even further-reaching forms of surveillance. 
Boyle4, following Foucault’s analysis of the Panopticon5, concludes that the state is creating an 
Internet Panopticon: ‘… the state has worked actively to embed or hardwire the legal regime in 
the technology itself’. An interesting aspect of this Internet Panopticon is that the state shifts the 
responsibility of enforcement to entities in the private sector, such as ISPs.  
In the meantime, as Schwartz writes, private entities are happily creating their own independent 
Panopticons.6 Businesses are collecting and processing vast amounts of personal data for 
different, but not all too different, reasons than the state does. In a sense, private-sector 
enterprises use monitoring and surveillance to have people behave the way they want. ‘Customers 
are disciplined by consumption itself to obey the rules, to be “good” not because it is morally 
preferable to being “bad” but because there is no conceivable alternative to being good, other than 
being put outside the reach of benefits”7. Coercion in this private Panopticon is replaced by 
consent, but the prevailing characteristics of panoptic logic remain.  
Thus, both the state and the private sector engage in surveillance of people’s lives. And while the 
motives and means vary, both public and private systematic prying into people’s privacy raises 
serious legal and ethical questions.  
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31.2 Technology, Privacy, and Lessig’s Code 
The Panopticon relies heavily on technology. Especially Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICTs) offer almost unlimited possibilities to facilitate perfect surveillance and 
monitoring, and hence invading people’s privacy. Partly as a result of the rise of the network 
society, some authors have already proclaimed privacy dead. Books and articles have been titled 
‘The Death of Privacy?’8 or ‘The End of Privacy’9. Or, as Scott McNeally, Sun Microsystems’ 
CEO, just after Intel in 1999 had acknowledged that they were able to track people through their 
new Pentium III chip, at a press conference proclaimed ‘You already have zero privacy -- get 
over it’.10 Both the influence of technology and the fact that people seemed to care less about 
privacy have been considered factors that warrant the statement that privacy is no longer feasible, 
or relevant, or neither of these.  
 
In this article, we intend to analyze this impact of technology on privacy. We do so by following 
Lawrence Lessig’s argument in the privacy chapter of his Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace11.
Lessig argues that ‘the code [i.e., technology] has already upset a traditional balance. It has 
already changed the control that individuals have over facts about their private lives.’ He 
illustrates this with several privacy-threatening technologies. After an analysis of different 
conceptions of privacy and arguments pro and con privacy protection, Lessig presents a response 
to privacy-threatening technology: privacy-enhancing technology. That is, in Lessig’s view, 
‘code’ that disturbs the traditional balance between privacy and other interests should be checked 
by ‘code’ that incorporates privacy values. This latter notion can be seen as an instance of what 
Reidenberg12 had earlier termed Lex Informatica: software and hardware that regulate 
themselves, or rather, Internet users and developers who regulate themselves through technology.  
 
Although we do not intend to analyze and criticize Lessig’s chapter on code and privacy 
specifically, it is necessary to take a closer look at Lessig’s analysis of the impact of code on 
privacy, and the solution he presents to the problems, in order to get a better understanding of the 
matter. 
Lessig considers privacy from a conventional point of view: privacy equals information privacy – 
a right to control one’s personal data (privacy control). This notion of information privacy is 
generally thought to be introduced by Westin in his epoch-making study ‘Privacy and 
Freedom’13, and is shared by many authors (such as Jerry Kang14, Fred Cate15, and Robert Post16). 
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4Privacy is undermined by ICTs as they allow for Electronic surveillance and the collection of 
personal data. These activities are problematic in Lessig’s view for two reasons: manipulation and 
loss of equality. The first problem is that the collection of personal data leads to profiling. The 
profiles constructed on the basis of initial data are used to “normalize the population of which the 
norm is drawn”17. This is done by presenting the person who fits a particular profile only the 
options the profiler wants her to see. Obviously, this scheme works best if the profiled is unaware 
of this selective feed of options. This kind of manipulation affects people’s autonomy to make 
choices. 
The second risk Lessig sees in modern data collection is that equality is affected. He argues that 
people in the private space were relatively equal as a result of the relative anonymity of these 
spaces and the fact that transactions could take place in relative anonymity as well18. This 
explicitly resulted from the fact that information to discriminate was too costly to acquire. 
Modern data collection, especially but not only in conjunction with merging multiple data 
sources, makes it possible to discriminate. Lessig exemplifies this phenomenon by pointing at 
frequent-flyer programs, which allow airlines to distinguish between classes of passengers. The 
profiling in this case is not too severe, as airline passengers are aware of the existence of 
frequent-flyer programs and everyone can join in on such a program. A more convincing example 
of the pressure on equality posed by profiling is offered by the opaque differentiation in types of 
customers was done by, for instance, online bookstore Amazon who presented different prices for 
DVDs on the basis of, for instance, the kind of browser used, whether one is a first-time or a 
repeat customer, and the ISP used by the customer.19 
Lessig’s solution to these threats is a two-tier system: code and property law. Lessig equates 
privacy with information privacy, and hence restoring people’s control over their personal data is 
the logical approach to address the imbalance caused by technology. Instead of calling for legal 
measures, such as fair information practices, Lessig seeks the solution in technology: privacy-
enhancing technologies. He embraces the idea of software implementing our privacy preferences; 
an electronic butler, who negotiates privacy protection on our behalf20 - a notion that builds on the 
World Wide Web Consortium’s P3P project. The electronic butler implements negotiating power, 
but what if the other party simply ignores the negotiations and proceeds in collecting and using 
personal data without a person’s consent? Lessig’s solution to this problem is to define personal 
data as property rights and hence introduce property law as the regime to protect people’s 
personal data. The advantage of relying on property law over data protection law lies in the fact 
that property law facilitates ex ante control over personal data; only after consent, personal data 
may be used. Obviously the consent will only be given at the right price. 
This brief summary of Lessig’s chapter on code and privacy shows that Lessig claims that:  
• privacy equals information privacy; 
• code upsets the privacy balance; 
 
16 Robert Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, California Law 
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5• personal data should be considered a property right; 
• code and property law should be used to restore the privacy balance. 
Lessig’s and others’ analysis of privacy as control and personal data that should be treated as a 
property right is contested (see further section 7). Nevertheless, it exemplifies an essentially 
American way of looking at privacy and privacy threats in the sense that it relies on market 
principles and self-regulation of private parties. The government is to abstain from interfering. In 
contrast we can place a European (continental) approach with government regulation for the fair 
treatment of personal data. In this article, we will not go in too much detail on the debate over the 
various privacy conceptions, but we do need a better grasp on the concept of privacy in order to 
understand the impact of code on privacy. For our purposes in this article, Lessig’s claims that 
code upsets the traditional privacy balance, and that ‘code’ can be used to restore this balance, is 
the most important.  
1.3 Research Questions and Overview 
In this article we try answer the following questions:  
• Is privacy-related regulation being implemented in code?  
• What (kind of) rules are embedded in this code? 
• What are the problems associated with this embedding of rules? Does ‘code’ indeed 
induce shifts in privacy balances? 
• What could and should be done, by whom and when, to address these problems? 
Here, we make a terminological distinction between code and ‘code’. With code, we denote 
software and hardware in general.21 ‘Code’, however, denotes software and hardware that 
function as a set of normative rules. That is, we use ‘code’ when we refer to ICT that incorporates 
certain normative elements, which serve to guide or control (what is perceived as) proper and 
acceptable behavior. We shall thus make clear throughout this article whether we speak of ICT in 
general (code) or of ICT that embeds certain norms or values (‘code’).22 
In answering the research questions we will look at both the public and the private sphere, as the 
panoptic state seems to be emerging in both. Both public and private entities make use of privacy-
threatening technologies, for different purposes and by different means. Privacy is not an absolute 
right, and intrusion of the private sphere is sometimes warranted. The interests of both parties 
involved have to be balanced. We will argue that different privacy balances exist in the various 
domains and that the impact and the assessment of this impact of code on privacy should be 
assessed with respect to the particular context. In other words, privacy and the question whether 
breaches of privacy are justified are context-specific, since privacy means different things in 
 
21 We use code rather than the general term of technology, since we focus on information and communication 
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6different contexts. Apart from the threats to privacy, we also try and indicate potential solutions 
to these threats.  
 
The article is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss a number of relevant notions 
with respect to privacy. We look at both the European perspective on privacy, which can be said 
to focus on dignity,23 and the U.S. perspective, which can be said to be liberty-oriented. In section 
3, we discuss developments on privacy and code in four domains, both in the public and the 
private sphere. Section 4 sums up the effects of ‘code’ on privacy that emerge from this case 
analysis, which we then analyze in section 5 according to basic questions that the notion of ‘code 
as law’ raises. Next, we try and pinpoint the main problems at stake, in section 6, and we 
conclude in section 7 by tentatively looking at options for actions to address these problems. 
2 Privacy 
2.1 Concepts of Privacy 
It has been noted in many an article or book on privacy: privacy is a slippery notion, often and 
easily used, but its precise meaning is far from clear. This is not surprising, nor is it problematic: 
it is the nature of value notions that they are not precisely delineated. In fact, privacy may be a 
clearer and more concise concept than, for instance, autonomy or liberty24. So, what does privacy 
amount to? What is it that can be assaulted by ‘code’? 
 
Many accounts of privacy take a theoretical approach in the sense that they try to define privacy 
from a philosophical, ethical, or moral point of view25. They are not primarily concerned with 
protecting privacy, or regulating privacy, by means of legal instruments such as legislation. Other 
accounts focus on the implementation of privacy provisions in legislation and/or the way courts 
handle privacy issues.26 Yet others address both the theoretical and legal-practical aspects of 
privacy.27 And they do this for good reasons. Society is changing, and cases arise all the time that 
do not adequately fit current legal practice. Such hard cases, as they are called in legal theory, 
give rise to reflection on the principles on which a particular legal doctrine is founded. Given our 
field of study, ‘code’ and privacy, this is especially apparent. We are not particularly interested in 
the cases that remain within the boundaries of ordinary data-protection law, for instance. We are 
interested in the cases that make us frown. In other words, the cases that give rise to consider 
changing legislation or legal practice. Hence we need to look at both the current legal practice, 
and the principles and theory surrounding the concept of privacy. 
We can start our little tour on the concept of privacy by looking at the various discussions that 
have taken place, and are still taking place, with respect to privacy.  
 
23 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty, Yale Law Journal 113 (2004), 
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25 C. Fried, Privacy, Yale Law Journal 1968, 475-493; J. Rachels, Why privacy is important, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 323-333 (1975); Westin 1967, supra, note 13. 
26 Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law: Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits. The Hague, London, New 
York: Kluwer Law International (2002). 
27 Blok 2002, supra, note 24. 
7Bygrave28 offers a distinction in four major ways in which the concept of privacy is defined that 
is useful for our analysis.  
The first group of definitions takes non-interference as its starting point. This conceptualization is 
highly influenced by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’ seminal 1890 paper ‘The right to 
privacy. The implicit made explicit’. Warren and Brandeis saw the right to privacy as part and 
parcel of ‘a right to be let alone’, and ‘the existing law affords a principle which may be invoked 
to protect the privacy of the individual from invasion […] by the too enterprising press’29. People 
should, for example, not be photographed by the press just like that, unless they choose to ‘go 
public’ themselves. 
The second group of definitions centers on the degree of access to a person. An influential 
popular definition in this category is given by Ruth Gavison30, who defines the amount of access 
to a person on three dimensions: secrecy (the amount of information about a person), solitude (the 
amount of physical access to a person), and anonymity (the amount of attention given to a 
person). Privacy in Gavison’s perception is a normatively neutral, instrumental concept. 
A third group sees privacy in terms of information control. Westin31, Fried32, Rachels33 and also 
Lessig belong to this group. Some quotes can illustrate their position. Westin considers privacy to 
be ‘an instrument for achieving individual goals of self realization’ and defines it as ‘being in a 
position to determine for oneself, when, how, and to what extent information about oneself is 
communicated to others’34; ‘the control we have over information about ourselves’35; ‘the ability 
to control who has access to us’36.
The fourth groups of definitions relates privacy closely to intimate or sensitive information. Julie 
Inness promotes this privacy concept when she writes: ‘the state of possessing control over a 
realm of intimate decisions, which includes decisions about intimate access, intimate information, 
and intimate actions’.37 This may also enhance personal expression and choice. 
2.2 Privacy Laws  
As privacy has found its way in all sorts of statutes, and is the subject of much case law, there is 
also a large body of knowledge on how society and the courts should cope with privacy.  
The way privacy is incorporated in positive law depends on legal traditions, however. In the U.S. 
common-law system, privacy provisions are scattered over many statutes and acts. The 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights are of course important, as they establish constitutional rights 
and privacy might qualify as such a right. Privacy as such, however, is not explicitly mentioned in 
either the Constitution or the Amendments. But this is precisely one of the reasons why Warren 
and Brandeis could argue that a right to privacy exists. A combination of Amendments, including 
 
28 Bygrave 2002, supra, note 26. 
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193-220 (1890). 
30 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the limits of law, Yale Law Journal, 421-471 (1980). 
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8the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments, and possibly the First, is generally 
seen to cover the basic aspects of privacy.38
Apart from the constitutional provisions, privacy law in the U.S. is sectoral. Many sectoral acts 
contain privacy provisions. Examples can be found at the federal level in, for instance, Title III of 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 on wiretapping, the Privacy Act of 1974 
that established a legal framework for the records collected by the federal government, the Cable 
Act of 1984 (cable television), the Video Privacy Protection Act (video rental records), the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (electronic mail), the Polygraph Protection Act 
of 1998 (lie detectors), and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (auto-dialers and 
junk faxes).39 At the state level, there are many more. Rotenberg40 argues that these sectoral laws, 
and the privacy provisions therein, are the result of new technologies entering the market and the 
need to regulate intrusive monitoring by these new technologies. 
 
In the European Continental tradition, there is a history of privacy protection, both in the various 
constitutions, as well as in various national laws as a result of, for instance, the implementation of 
European Community Directives, for instance the EC Data Protection Directive.41 The 
cornerstone of European privacy protection is Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which states: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.  
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
This provision establishes the core of privacy protection by protecting private life, and by 
specifying three particular spheres: home, family, and correspondence. This core and these 
spheres are associated with three types of privacy-protection measures. 
1. Physical Privacy: the protection of people’s physical bodies against invasive procedures, such 
as genetic tests, drug testing, and body searches (bodily privacy), as well as the setting of limits 
on intrusion into the home and other physical environments, such as the workplace42 (territorial 
privacy). This covers searches, video surveillance, and other forms of monitoring. 
2. Relational Privacy: both the security and privacy of communications, such as mail, telephones, 
e-mail, and direct communication, and the privacy of personal or intimate relationships, such as 
family life. 
3. Informational Privacy: included in the private life, and developed in especially the EC Data 
Protection Directive, is the protection of informational privacy. This involves the establishment of 
rules governing the collection and handling of personal data, such as credit information, and 
medical and government records.  
 
38 Justice Douglas, for instance upheld this idea in his famous ‘penumbra’ argument in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965). 
39 Marc. Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), Stanford 
Technology Law Review (2001), <http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/01_STLR_1>. 
40 Id.
41 Directive 95/46/EC. 
42 The workplace can also be protected by article 8 ECHR. See, e.g., Niemitz v. Germany (16 December 1992), Publ. 
ECHR, Series A, Vol. 251-B; Halford v. UK (25 June 1997), Reports 1997 – III.  
92.3 The Privacy Balance and Reasonable Expectations 
Is privacy an absolute right? Although some claim it is, or at least go a long way in this direction, 
no-one effectively claims that privacy is completely inviolable. Breaches of privacy can be 
justified by considerations of the common good. A balance is required between privacy and other 
interests, and particularly with sensitive interests such as law enforcement and national security, 
this balance has always been a precarious one that seems to be continually contested. 
Etzioni43, for instance, claims that privacy is overvalued and that a new balance has to be found 
between privacy and other values. ‘We need to treat privacy as an individual right that is to be 
balanced with concerns for the common good – or as one good among others, without a priori 
privileging any of them’44. Bearing in mind that he wrote this before 9/11, the view that privacy 
should not be ‘privileged’ has since gained wider acclaim.  
 
In the European context, the privacy balance is essentially struck through the second paragraph of 
article 8 ECHR. Breaches of privacy are allowed if they are necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. This means that the privacy violation has to be proportional to its 
goals, and the goal should not be attainable by another, less infringing measure. Moreover, the 
breach of privacy has to be ‘in accordance with the law’, and hence has to be sufficiently clear 
and foreseeable for citizens, so that they are able to know in what circumstances their privacy can 
be violated. These criteria of legality, legitimacy, subsidiarity, and proportionality are also 
embedded in the fair information-processing standards set by EC Directives and implemented in 
national data-protection legislation in the EU member states. As such, balancing the various 
interests is inherent to the European data-protection regime.45 
In the U.S. context, an important concept in assessing the right to privacy is that of ‘reasonable 
expectation’. This concept was introduced in U.S. case law in the light of the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. In 1968, the Supreme Court in 
Katz v. United States46 decided the placement by federal authorities of an electronic listening 
device in a public phone booth to be unconstitutional. Justice Harlan wrote that the protected zone 
under the Fourth Amendment is defined by the individual’s ‘actual’, subjective expectation of 
privacy, to the extent to which that expectation is ‘one that society [was] prepared to recognize as 
reasonable’. In a large number of cases, the reasonable expectation of privacy has been the test to 
decide whether the (federal) state has unconstitutionally breached someone’s privacy. Thus, for 
example, reasonable expectations of privacy can exist in homes, businesses, sealed luggage and 
packages, but no reasonable expectations of privacy were found in bank records, voice or writing 
 
43 A. Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy. New York: Basic Books (1999). 
44 Id.
45 Paul De Hert, Privacy en het gebruik van visuele technieken door burger en politie (Privacy and the use of visual 
technologies by citizens and the policy). Brussels: Politeia (1998). 
46 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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samples, phone numbers, and automobile passenger compartments, trunks and glove 
compartments.47
Although reasonable expectations of privacy as such do not play a role in the continental concept 
of privacy, as justified breaches of privacy are covered in article 8(2) ECHR, the concept 
nevertheless plays a role in the European outlook on privacy. The balancing test of deciding when 
a privacy violation is necessary in a democratic society, after all, depends on the seriousness of 
the privacy violation, and this in turn relies to a certain extent on the way or amount of privacy 
that people experience in that particular context. This is one of the reasons why a closer look at 
the relation between technology and privacy is warranted. People will generally base their online 
expectations on offline experiences, and expect to have the same level of protection online. In the 
case of new, privacy-invasive technologies, the user will have a false expectation of privacy. And 
hence the use of such technologies will be considered a greater violation of privacy. This requires 
the interest served by infringing the privacy of the user to have more weight if such a use is to be 
allowed under the balancing test of article 8(2) ECHR.48
2.4 An Example: Webcasting 
To illustrate how new technologies affect privacy adversely and how a loss in actual privacy may 
lead to shifts in reasonable privacy expectations or in the balance of privacy and other interests, 
we shall describe a prototypical case: webcasting or webradio.  
One of the problems with technology and privacy is that in some instances breaches of privacy, 
potentially at least, occur in situations where the users of the technology are unaware of the 
possible breaches as they expect to have privacy. Radio, and later television, were originally 
broadcast over the air as a practical way to reach people in geographically diverse locations. 
Anyone with the proper equipment could tune in to a show and listen to, or view, the 
audio(visual) content provided by the broadcaster. As there is no way to monitor who listens to 
what on ether broadcast radio, the technology does not affect people’s privacy. This changed with 
the introduction of cable networks in the 1970s and advances in content encryption. These means 
provided content providers with more control over their audience, as it opened the way to 
subscription-based broadcasting and pay-per-view models. The different types of subscription 
models have different effects on the privacy of the users. Whereas a subscription model generally 
only gives information on the channels a subscriber subscribes to, a pay-per-view model implies 
insight in the programs listened by a subscriber. These data by virtue of being capable of being 
related to subscriber data, do impact people’s privacy. 
 
The Internet has become an important channel for the delivery of audiovisual content in ways that 
resemble the traditional radio and television broadcasting. Streaming-media protocols, such as the 
Real Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP)49 and Real-Time Protocol (RTP), enable anyone with a 
broadband Internet connection to set up on-demand delivery of real-time data, such as audio and 
video, in live data feeds or stored clips. Delivery can take place either unicast, in which the client 
 
47 Cate 1997, supra, note 15. 
48 In the European Union, that is. 
49 <ftp://ftp.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2326.txt>. 
11
chooses what and when to receive, or multicast, in which case every client receives the same data 
at the same time.  
Listeners or viewers use audio and video players, such as RealPlayer, Windows Media Player, or 
iTunes to connect to a streaming server. The player requests the server to open a session in which 
particular data is streamed to the client. Client and server exchange information about the location 
(server and client IP address) and the content to be broadcast. 
Webradio has become quite popular and is used by traditional radio stations as a supplementary 
service or as a means to reach larger audiences. But also, thousands of non-professional providers 
have set up webradio stations. The popularity of webradio is due to the unprecedented number of 
‘radio’ stations a listener can access with simple means: an ordinary PC with a broadband 
connection (cable or DSL). 
The fact that client and server exchange data for the proper functioning of the service does not 
necessarily affect the privacy of the listeners. As long as no logs are kept, there are no privacy 
issues per se. The catch in this case relates to the content provided. Most material broadcast is 
copyrighted material, and hence webradio or webcasting touches upon copyright law. Although it 
is being debated whether webcasters are to pay license fees and to whom – the artists and/or the 
record industry –, the case has been settled in many countries.50 Webcasters generally need a 
license agreement with the copyright holder or the representatives of the copyright holders 
(neighboring rights), the SENA in the Netherlands, for instance. The webcaster has to pay 
remuneration for each track (song) streamed for each listener.51 
This royalty-payment scheme, made possible by the technology, differs from that of traditional 
over-the-air radio. Traditional radio-broadcast license fees are based on estimates of the number 
of listeners of a particular radio station. Webradio allows for a much more precise scheme, 
because the listener’s mediaplayer, iTunes for instance, requests a particular webradio station to 
start streaming content to the client. The webcaster therefore knows exactly which clients tunes in 
to its broadcast, when and how long. This facilitates the production of exact data on the number 
of clients tuned in on each track streamed by the webcaster. Webcasters are obliged to produce 
these data in their quarterly reports to (representatives of the) rights-holders, such as SENA, and 
as such they keep detailed listener logs, containing the date and time a particular client has tuned 
in and out of particular stations, as well as the client’s IP address. IP addresses can in some 
instances be traced back to individuals, and hence can be identifiers.52 This means that data 
maintained by webcasters, and made available to organizations such as the SENA, can be used 
for monitoring and profiling of listeners. An individual webcaster of, say, Lowlands Jazz, may be 
able to infer information from the patterns Ronald’s computer leaves in their listeners’ log. It may 
tell something about Ronald’s taste as he tends to tune in to another station (unknown to the 
LowLands Jazz station) at moments that suggest his taste to be the motivator (for instance, after a 
couple of notes or the start of a new program). Or, it may tell something about his living habits, if 
patterns occur in the times he tunes in to the station (such as, usually in weekends rather than 
working days, and on Tuesdays, which turns out to be his day off). The impact on the privacy of 
 
50 See, for instance, Bonneville International Corp. v. US Copyright Office, 01-3720, 17-10-2003 (3rd Circ. 2003). 
51 In the Netherlands, the fee in 2004 was 0.00084 € per track per listener. In the U.S., it was 0.0007 $ in 2002. 
52 According to the Dutch Data Protection Authority, <http://www.cbpweb.nl/documenten/uit_z2000-0340.htm>.  
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the listener increases if various listener logs are merged, especially if they are combined with 
other online traces, such as website logs, which also contain IP addresses. 
Most people are aware of the fact that IP addresses are logged when they surf the internet. But are 
they aware that webcasters also collect data on their use of the service? Of old, one could listen to 
over-the-air radio anonymously, and many people will expect webcasting not to depart from this 
idea. Yet it does. The webradio listener is monitored and the data collected can in principle be 
used for other purposes than remuneration.  
 
How should we assess this example? Webcasting as a species of ‘radio’ introduces a shift in the 
privacy balance. Listening to broadcast radio is no longer completely anonymous if done through 
webradio. What can justify this diminishing of privacy? If we apply Etzioni’s (communitarian) 
test,53 then clearly there is no well-documented and macroscopic threat to the common good; the 
listeners log is just a convenient way to meet financial or economic needs. As IP addresses are 
unique, they provide convenient metering units. Is this enough to warrant the diminishing of the 
privacy protection? Not necessarily, especially if there are (even) less intrusive ways to measure 
the number of listeners at any give time. 
Nevertheless, it may well be that the new privacy infringement goes unnoticed or unheeded by 
the public and government at large, thus de facto establishing a new – lower – privacy standard. 
And perhaps as people get used to being ‘watched’ by webradio, they no longer mind that this 
affects their personal lives, and it will not be regarded as reasonable anymore to expect privacy 
when listening to the radio.  
2.5 A Contextual-Functional Perspective 
We have discussed some ways of looking at privacy, both from a theoretical and from a legal 
point of view. One of its central characteristics, also emerging from the example of webcasting, is 
the notion of reasonable expectations or the balancing test. This indicates that privacy is a living, 
continually changing thing, a fluid concept, dependent on socio-cultural factors.  
With respect to these socio-cultural factors, Whitman writes: ‘What must be hidden before the 
eyes of others, seems to differ from society to society’. In a recent paper, he discusses two 
western cultures of privacy.54 He describes the European culture on the one hand, which has the 
protection of a right to respect and personal dignity at its core. The continental European privacy 
rights are rights to one’s image, name and reputation, and what the Germans call the right to 
informational self-determination.55 On the other hand he places the U.S. tradition, which is 
 
53 Etzioni 1999, supra, note 43, proposes a test for determining whether privacy and the common good are out of 
balance. Privacy should only be limited if society is threatened by a well-documented and macroscopic threat. If 
this test is passed, one should consider if these threats can be countered without first resorting to measures that 
might restrict privacy. The measures introduced should be minimally intrusive, and measures that treat undesirable 
side-effects of needed privacy-diminishing measures are to be preferred over those that ignore these effects. 
Privacy-diminishing measures in Etzioni’s view should therefore be necessary, which resembles the European 
continental notion of finality, they should be in accordance with the subsidiarity principle (as a last resort), and 
proportional (minimally intrusive). 
54 Whitman 2004, supra, note 23. See also Reidenberg’s analysis of the US and European approaches to privacy: Joel 
R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, Stanf. L. Rev 52, 1315-
1376 (2000). <http://reidenberg.home.sprynet.com/international_rules.pdf>.  
55 Whitman 2004, supra, note 23. 
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oriented toward ‘values of liberty, and especially liberty over against the state’. This emphasis on 
liberty is in line with the traditional American pre-occupation with fear for intrusions by the state, 
especially in one’s own home. These differences in core values have consequences as to what 
should be protected against intrusion. In continental Europe, credit-card reporting, for instance is 
seen as a ‘dangerous exposure of private life to most Europeans’56 and governed by strict 
regulation, whereas in the US, it is common practice. Dignity in the continental mind is no less 
important than market efficiency. Also, workplace e-mail, and consumer data are much more 
deemed worthy of protection in continental Europe than in the US.57 Whitman also notes 
examples where US privacy protection is much stronger than continental protection. Phone 
wiretapping by the police in many European countries occurs much more frequently than in the 
US, and is perfectly legal. Another interference with private affairs that may strike Americans as 
odd is the fact that judges can intervene with respect to the name given to a newborn baby by its 
parents. A case arose when French parents decided to call their daughter “Mégane Renaud”, 
pronounced the same as Renault Mégane, a popular French car at the time. Although the courts 
ultimately decided not to overrule the parents, they could have done so.58 
Not only between societies is there a difference in what is deemed suitable for protection under 
the guise of privacy, but the concept also changes over time.59 Societal changes such as changing 
attitudes with respect to moral standards, to clothing and to behavior are well described.60 Most 
dramatic may be the impact of the terrorist attacks of late on privacy notions.  
Also, the impact of ICT on the concept of privacy is given ample consideration in research.61 It 
has almost become commonplace to assert that developments in the fields of ICT have had a 
tremendous influence on policymaking, regulation and legislation with regard to privacy. But 
other factors have been important as well. First of all, the exponential growth of ICT applications 
was situated in an eventful socio-economic context. In many countries, a new demarcation of the 
private and public sectors of society has taken place, a process that is still going on. The 
privatization and semi-privatization of formerly public or semi-public institutions have changed 
ideas about the permissibility of all kinds of ways in which personal data are used. Second, the 
past decades have witnessed a growing internationalization, not to say globalization, of what were 
formerly merely local or national activities. This has sharpened the exchange of different views 
on and usages of privacy, for instance, between Europe and the United States. All of these factors 
– technological developments, socio-economic changes, the fading importance of national 
boundaries – have influenced the regulation of privacy, and they have contributed to changes in 
the meaning and significance that are assigned to privacy, both by ordinary citizens and by 




58 Cited in id., (JCP 2001, IV.2655). The court’s opinon emphasized that the parents had had any “arrières-pensées”— 
that is, any unacknowledged or ulterior intentions, and that the car model in question would likely go out of 
production by the time the child reached school age. 
59 B. Moore, Privacy: Studies in social and cultural history. Armonk: ME Sharpe (1984). 
60 Westin 1967, supra, note 13. 
61 See, for instance, Cate 1997, supra, note 15; Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, Berkeley Technology Law Journal 
18 (2003); Froomkin 2000, supra, note 8; Schwartz 2000, supra, note 6. 
14
In turn, this increasing attention of legislatures and policy makers for privacy itself has led to 
structural changes in the meaning of privacy. Law and regulation, through their authoritative 
status, have had a steering and enshrining effect on the meaning of privacy and the privacy 
discourse. 
Johnson summarizes the image we have described so far nicely: ‘[p]rivacy is a conventional 
concept. What is considered private is socially or culturally defined. It varies from context to 
context, it is dynamic, and it is quite possible that no single example can be found of something 
which is considered private in every culture’62.
This raises the question how to evaluate the possible influence of ‘code’ on this fluid notion of 
privacy without resorting to abstract truisms. Some authors, such as Vedder,63 have proposed to 
use a contextual-functional framework that does justice to the influence of contextual factors, and 
– at the same time – enables us to understand how and why the notion of privacy works in that 
context. This means that we should depart the normative point of privacy, and instead take an 
instrumental view; privacy is not an end in itself, but merely a means to achieving other goals.64
The goals promoted by privacy are abundantly discussed in literature. For instance, Johnson 
proposes ‘personal freedom’;65 Benn puts forward a limited set of sub dimensions of freedom: the 
freedom of self-presentation and moral autonomy.66 Such monistic values do not help us in 
accomplishing our goal of making more specific statements and to transcend the level of abstract 
truisms. To accomplish this goal, we can join Vedder67, who rejects monistic underlying values 
and instead proposes that we look at particular contexts to denote the functions and values of 
privacy in these contexts. In this view, privacy is an instrumental value that can serve the 
fulfillment of various other values, and it depends on the context just which value privacy 
enhances. In other words, privacy serves multiple functions, one or more of which can be relevant 
depending on the particular situation.  
We will therefore look at various fields in which privacy-related ‘code’ is at work, and try to 
assess what privacy means in that specific context, in order to analyze how ‘code’ affects the 
balance between privacy and other interests.  
 
In order to be able to denote what underlying values and functions privacy in those particular 
contexts may serve, we shall outline some candidates. The values and interests served by privacy 
are well studied. For our present purposes, a list provided by Bygrave suffices. This list contains a 
number of values that recur in the extensive literature on values and interests served by privacy. 
He distinguishes individual and societal values served by privacy protection. The core individual 
values are: 
 
62 J.L. Johnson, Privacy and the judgment of others, The Journal of Value Inquiry, 157-168 (1989). 
63 A.H. Vedder, Medical Data, New Information Technologies, and the Need for Normative Principles other than 
Privacy Rules, in: Law and Medicine: Current Legal Issues, edited by M. Freeman and A. Lewis (eds.). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 441- 459 (2000). Compare also the approach of Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as 
Contextual Integrity, Washington Law Review 79, 119-158 (2004), 
<http://crypto.stanford.edu/portia/papers/RevnissenbaumDTP31.pdf>.  
64 Bygrave 2002, supra, note 26; Cate 1997, supra, note 15. 
65 Johnson 1989, supra, note 62. 
66 S. I. Benn, A theory of freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1988). 
67 Vedder 2000, supra, note 63. 
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 Individuality: Individuality reflects the fact that we want to see ourselves as individual 
persons. The protection of individuality means a protection against flattening out, or 
becoming one-dimensional. Profiling is a technology that touches upon this sense of 
individuality, as it assigns characteristics to individuals based on characteristics of others.  
 Autonomy: This value is related to individuality; it is a person’s ability to make his own 
choices.  
 Dignity: Dignity is the right to be shielded against unwanted public exposure – to be spared 
embarrassment or humiliation. Whitman (2004) even calls dignity the core of privacy in the 
continental tradition. 
 Integrity: This is the right to be taken as a whole. This value is closely associated with 
dignity, autonomy, and individuality; 
 Emotional release: The release from public roles provides an individual with an opportunity 
to be out of the public eye, to retreat from public role-playing and be ‘herself’.  
 Self-evaluation: Self-evaluation relates to the time and space an individual needs to process 
the information she constantly gets into a meaningful whole, and to reflect on herself and her 
position in the world.  
 Protected communication: This relates to the notion of being able to communicate with others 
confidentially, without running the risk of being overheard. This value is closely related to 
the core US value of freedom (of expression). 
Also for society as a whole, privacy serves important values. Civility, stability, pluralism, and 
democracy are central values in this respect. 
On the other hand, giving up one’s private sphere and disclosing personal data also has values 
which are important for society. A comprehensive list of values served by giving up privacy is 
provided by Walker.68 
 Cost: Private enterprises aim at profiling customers and value direct marketing as it may 
lower their cost of doing business. In return, they offer discounts and special services to loyal 
customers.  
 Access: Personalization (with preferences derived from a user’s conduct), customization (with 
preferences derived from a user’s expressed desires), and interactivity (a user’s interaction 
with a website to obtain tailored content) add value to online experience and result in 
repeated access of sites offering these facilities.  
 Convenience: Convenience results from the fact that services can be tailored to particular 
users or clients thereby focusing the interaction, for instance by offering purchase 
recommendations.  
 Collaboration: Collaboration is important, as some services can only be offered if sufficient 
numbers of collaborators exist. Telephone directories, for instance, only have value if a 
sufficient number of telephone subscribers are listed.  
 Community: Community refers to a social need to know the people one engages with; 
compare the Cheers opening song, “You want to go where everybody knows your name”.  
 
68 Kent Walker, Where Everybody Knows Your Name: A Pragmatic Look at the Costs of Privacy and the Benefits of 
Information Exchange, Stanford Technology Law Review (2000), <http://stlr.stanford.edu/stlr/articles/00_stlr_2>. 
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 Security: Security of online transactions can be improved by means of identification and 
authentication. Credit-card fraud can be traced and noticed when credit-card companies have 
access to the card holder’s spending history. 
 Accountability/responsibility: Anonymous interaction in cyberspace is thought to facilitate 
‘wrongs’, it is sometimes presumed that these wrongs can be prevented if people do not 
interact anonymously. 
 Trust: Trust in online relationships can often not be based on the parties’ knowing each other. 
Sharing personal data makes it possible to find out more about whether a party is trustworthy.  
3 ‘Code’ and Privacy in Context 
What do we mean by ‘code’ & privacy? The relationship between ‘code’ & intellectual property 
is relatively clear.69 For instance, code embedded in media players in the form of Digital Rights 
Management (DRM) systems, makes people conform to the rules put forward by the designer of 
the media player, who no doubt has implemented these in accordance with the wishes of the 
rights-holders of the media. ‘Code’ in this context precludes violations and automates the 
enforcement of public decisions.70 
The relationship between ‘code’ and privacy is less clear. Obviously, technology may affect 
privacy. Technology facilitates monitoring and surveillance, and vast amounts of personal data 
can be collected and processed, thus affecting information privacy. But can ‘code’ with respect to 
privacy play a role similar to that in the context of intellectual property, as exemplified by DRM 
systems? It can, but there is a discrepancy. Whereas one might see ‘code’ as a threat to privacy, 
the opposite actually, is more likely to be the case. ‘Code’ can be used to prevent actors and 
organizations to breach privacy, just as ‘code’ precludes violations of copyright law through 
DRM systems. In the context of ‘code’ and privacy, ‘code’ has the potential to protect the rights 
of the users, whereas in the context of IPR, and also of ‘code’ and speech, it has the potential to 
limit the individual’s rights. 
Privacy protecting rules can be hardwired within the infrastructure of the Internet and 
applications. Two prominent examples are the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) projects 
Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS)71 and Platform for Privacy Preferences Project 
(P3P)72. PICS allows content providers to add metadata describing the nature of the content to 
internet content. Next to the metadata, PICS allows for filters to be designed that filter content on 
the basis of the preferences of the user with respect to content she wants to see or block. It was 
originally intended to help parents and teachers to determine what children can access on the 
Internet. But also privacy-protecting metadata and filters can be assigned73. In this case content 
providers are required to label their content with metadata describing their use of data provided 
by the user. The user’s application (a web browser, for instance) can then decide on the basis of 
these labels whether a particular website acts in accordance with her wishes. 
 
69 See the chapter by Natali Helberger in Asscher 2005, supra, note 1. 
70 Joel R. Reidenberg, States and Internet Enforcement, University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal (2004), 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=487965>. 
71 <http:// http://w3.org/PICS/>. 
72 <http://www.w3.org/p3p>. 
73 See for instance <http://www.droit.fundp.ac.be/crid/eclip/pics.html>. 
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The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) is to provide an automated way for users to 
gain more control over the use of personal information on web sites they visit. Web sites are to 
store information about the way they handle personal information in machine-readable form 
(XML). The user stores her own privacy preferences in her browser, which is then capable of 
comparing the website’s privacy characteristics with the user’s preferences and decides to enter 
the website or not. 
Another example of this kind of embedding policy in code can be seen in the changes Microsoft 
made to their “.Net Passport” service as a result of the objections raised to the original design by 
the Article 29 Working Party.74 Microsoft built the European data privacy protections directly 
into the company’s technology.75 
This notion of ‘code’ & privacy where ‘code’ appears to protect privacy, rather than to infringe 
upon it, runs counter to what we actually perceive. This discrepancy exists if we do not separate 
the different kinds or uses of ‘code’ or technology in general. Technology in many ways threatens 
privacy. If we take ‘code’ to indicate technology or code in a broad sense, it then by itself is often 
privacy-threatening in the sense that it can be used to invade people’s privacy. Taken specifically, 
however, as rules built into technology, ‘code’ can be seen as providing at least as much privacy 
enhancement as privacy threats.  
For the purposes of this article, the obvious starting point seems to be the first meaning: code as 
technology in general, which is usually – if not always – more privacy-threatening than privacy-
friendly by its nature (see section 4). But since privacy is all about balance, the other meaning of 
built-in rules comes in usefully: privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) can be a solution to re-
establishing disturbed balances. In the analysis of various domains in which the privacy balance 
may be shifting, we shall therefore start with a general notion of privacy-influencing technology, 
and then indicate whether and how privacy-protecting norms could be built-in in technology as a 
possible part of addressing potential shifts in protection.  
3.1 Law Enforcement 
As of old, law enforcement is one of the prime contenders in privacy debates. By its nature, law 
enforcement should uncover what is hidden and what people like to keep hidden. The natural 
tendency to safeguard the interest of law enforcement therefore is to create investigation powers 
that uncover hidden things, if necessary by force. Constitutional protection against (over)intrusive 
searches and other kinds of prying into people’s lives is one of the most important areas in which 
we see privacy at work. And although people may easily say they ‘have nothing to hide’, thus 
suggesting that the police should be given ample room for crime investigation, most of them 
would still protest when the police installs a camera in their bedroom to prevent marital murders. 
Privacy in the sense of protection from government intrusion into the private sphere of its citizens 
is still very much an issue. 
 
74 The Article 29 Working Party is the consortium of the European data-protection supervisory authorities that 
monitors compliance with EU data-protection regulation.  
75 See, for instance, <http://www.informationweek.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=6512119>; see also Reidenberg 
2004, supra, note 70. 
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The context of law enforcement is also one of the prime areas in which ‘code’ affects privacy. 
Two major developments in technology have swayed the traditional balance of law enforcement 
and privacy over the past decades.  
The first is the advent of new surveillance technologies. Technologies like transaction monitoring 
and location monitoring through tiny beacons or mobile telephony, directional microphones, 
hacking, and merging public and forensic databases are already sufficiently developed to be used 
to great advantage for law enforcement. In the near future, advanced video surveillance with face 
recognition, aerial photography, automated speech recognition and voice recognition, and 
spyware may add to law-enforcement’s intrusion potential. Still somewhat further ahead looms 
the use of technologies like Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)76, ambient intelligence77, and 
‘smart dust’78 that may enable systematic, covert, and perfect tracking and observing of people 
into the most detailed aspects of their personal lives. Most of these technologies enable not only 
reactive searching, but also proactive monitoring to detect criminals on the verge of committing a 
crime.  
The second development is equally important, but less obvious. More and more areas of people’s 
lives are being digitized, and on-line methods replace off-line methods of doing things, in 
communication, banking, shopping, education, photography, archiving, et cetera. This means that 
an ever-increasing amount of data about personal life is digitized and stored somewhere. In turn, 
this enables law enforcement to gather many more data with ‘on-line’ powers than used to be 
available to them with the matching ‘off-line’ powers.  
In order to illustrate how these developments work in practice, we will sketch two examples that 
show various ways in which ‘code’ functions in the law-enforcement context. 
Case 1: Interceptability of Telecommunications 
The interception of telecommunications has always been an important tool for law enforcement. 
With the growth of telecommunications, this importance has only increased – interception is one 
of the most vital tools for investigating and prosecuting crime nowadays.  
With the developments in telecommunications that took place in the 1990s, however, it 
increasingly seemed that the police could no longer rely on the plain old telephone system for its 
interception. New technologies, infrastructures and services, such as mobile telephony, packet-
switched communications, and call-forwarding, were not necessarily as easy to intercept 
technically. Therefore, governments decided to establish regulations that demanded the telecoms 
industry to build into their technology a wiretap capability, thus making sure that it was at least 
technically feasible for law enforcement to continue to intercept, regardless of further 
technological developments.  
 
76 Ann Cavoukian, Tag, You’re It: Privacy implications of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Technology, 
Ontario: Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario, 2004. 
77 Ambient intelligence is ‘a pervasive and unobtrusive intelligence in the surrounding environment supporting the 
activities and interactions of the users’, see for instance <http://www.ambientintelligence.net/> 
78 ‘Smart dust’ are sensor systems implemented in objects of 1 cubic millimetre, see for instance <http://www-
bsac.eecs.berkeley.edu/~mattlast/research/index.html> and <http://robotics.eecs.berkeley.edu/~pister/SmartDust/>. 
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In the United States, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 
(CALEA) was passed in October 1994.79 The purpose of CALEA is “to preserve the ability of 
law enforcement to conduct electronic surveillance in the face of rapid advances in 
telecommunications technology”.80 It requires telecommunications carriers to ensure that their 
equipment, facilities, and services are capable of, among other things, enabling the government to 
intercept communications content and to access call-identifying information (47 U.S.C. § 1002 
(a)). Moreover, the law also demands a certain number of simultaneously interceptable lines (47 
U.S.C. § 1003) – a provision that led to fierce debates when the Federal Communications 
Commission made proposals to implement this. The law provides a ‘safe harbor’ for telecom 
carriers if they comply with publicly available technical requirements or standards adopted by an 
industry association or standard-setting organization (47 U.S.C. § 1006).81 And, in turn, 
manufacturers of telecommunications equipment and providers of support services are required to 
make available to telecom carriers equipment and services that comply with the interceptability 
requirements (47 U.S.C. § 1005(b)).  
Pursuant to CALEA, the telecom industry has developed and is still developing technical 
standards for interceptability. For instance, a subcommittee of the Telecommunications Industry 
Association (TIA), together with a committee of the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry 
Solutions, has developed an interim standard, J-STD-025, that should meet the CALEA 
requirements. Since the FCC found the standard deficient in some respects, it added more 
requirements (a ‘punch list’), e.g., to identify the active parties of a multiparty call, and to provide 
all signals, such as the use of feature keys, available from the subject.  
Telecom manufacturers have also been active: the “FBI has signed agreements with AG 
Communications Systems, Lucent Technologies, Motorola, Nortel Networks, and Siemens AG 
for technical solutions developed to meet the assistance capability requirements of CALEA.”82 
The United States has not been the only country to pass legislation on interceptability. Indeed, the 
European Union quickly followed the U.S. with a Council Resolution of 17 January 1995, which 
outlined quite similar requirements for interceptability.83 Arguing that “interception may only be 
effected insofar as the necessary technical provisions have been made”, the resolution listed the a 
summary of the needs of law enforcement “for the technical implementation of legally authorized 
interception in modern telecommunications systems”. Subsequently, the member states carried 
out the resolution by passing laws similar to CALEA.  
The relationship with industry and standard-setting bodies was less direct – or more covert – in 
Europe than in the U.S. An EU body did send a letter to international standardization 
organizations (IEC, ISO, and ITU) in December 1995, pointing out the resolution and “inviting” 
 
79 Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279, available at <http://www.askcalea.net/>.  
80 <http://www.askcalea.net/faqs.html#05>.  
81 See <http://www.askcalea.net/standards.html> for an overview of available standards. Although “publicly 
available”, the standards are not cheap: for instance, it costs USD352 to download standard J-STD-025-B-2003, 
<https://www.atis.org/atis/docstore/doc_display.asp?ID=2570>.  
82 <http://www.askcalea.net/faqs.html#14>.  
83 Council Resolution of 17 January 1995 on the lawful interception of telecommunications (96/C 329/01), Official 
Journal 4 November 1996.  
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to take account of the requirements,84 but the EU resolution nor the national implementation laws 
do not explicitly refer to standard-setting bodies, nor do they require telecom manufacturers to 
develop interceptable equipment. Apparently, it was left more to industry itself – both telecom 
providers and manufacturers – to develop and incorporate interceptable equipment and services.  
Although several industry and standardization bodies, such as the U.S. TIA and ATI and the 
European ETSI, have been working on incorporating interception norms in the technology, other 
bodies have consciously refrained from doing so. It is instructive to read the statement of the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) on their wiretap policy, which explains why the IETF 
decided not to consider interception requirements as part of their standard-developing work.85
Apart from considering that building-in interception capability will make the network 
considerably more complex and hence more vulnerable, it also argues that IETF standards relate 
to cross-border communications that pass numerous jurisdictions with numerous, and diverging, 
requirements for privacy. Building-in a uniform privacy-infringing option would therefore not be 
a Good Thing; rather, national bodies should develop the standards according to their own 
jurisdiction regime. This is a rather odd argument for a body like the IETF, since the Internet by 
its nature can hardly cope with diverging national technical standards. Perhaps the real reason 
why the IETF did not want to develop interceptability is their fear for abuse: “Experience shows 
that tools designed for one purpose that are effective for another tend to be used for that other 
purpose too, no matter what its designers intended. (...) What this boils down to is that if effective 
tools for wiretapping exist, it is likely that they will be used as designed, for purposes legal in 
their jurisdiction, and also in ways they were not intended for, in ways that are not legal in that 
jurisdiction. When weighing the development or deployment of such tools, this should be borne 
in mind.” In other words, the IETF has refrained from building-in a specific option for 
interceptability, partly because such ‘code’ may not meet the privacy laws of certain countries 
and also because the technology can be abused to infringe privacy in ways unintended by the 
designers.  
 
The case of interceptability of telecommunications shows that governments have passed 
legislation that requires technology providers to build in certain features related to legal norms, in 
this case, the feasibility of the investigation power of interception. Industry has – naturally – 
complied with these legal requirements, and hence, telecommunications infrastructures have a 
built-in capacity for interception, and they have included more detailed interception features 
according to the requirements set by governments. This is not to say that telecom technology is 
inherently privacy-infringing, but it is thus at least capable of being privacy-infringing.  
Perhaps because of the IETF’s concern with resulting vulnerabilities and privacy risks, the 
privacy-threatening ‘code’ has not been incorporated in the lower levels of the Internet 
architecture – telecom providers use software and hardware add-ons to ensure interceptability. 
This allows for national differentiation. At the same time, however, this has also created less 
transparency, since – as opposed to Internet standards – interceptability technologies and their use 
 
84 Statewatch, European Union and FBI launch global surveillance system, February 1997, 
<http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/tapping/statewatch_tap_297.html>.  
85 RFC 2804, May 2000, endorsed by the Internet Architecture Board and Internet Engineering Steering Group, 
<http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2804.txt>.  
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are kept rather obscure. The U.S. debates over the Carnivore system, which allows interception of 
packet-switched communications, illustrate the tendency of governments not to publish details 
about law-enforcement-related technologies.86 
Case 2: Cryptography 
‘Cryptography’ indicates systems that alter data so that unauthorized people cannot access them. 
It is, essentially, a privacy-enhancing technology, since it can protect the secrecy of 
communications and of stored data. In the 1970s, cryptography saw two developments that were 
to be of great significance to the development of the information age. First, the U.S. developed 
the Data Encryption Standard (DES), an automated crypto system. This was based on traditional 
cryptographic methods, but DES was so well designed that it proved to be uncrackable even by 
supercomputers until the mid-1990s. After DES, several similar systems were devised that proved 
to be equally strong, or stronger still through the use of longer keys.  
Second, and even more important, public-key cryptography was invented, a system in which 
people no longer share a single key to encode and decode a message; instead, each person has a 
key pair with a public and a private key. Through public-key cryptography, people can 
communicate without having to exchange a key through a secure channel. You can send someone 
your public key in an e-mail message, with which she can send you a message that only you can 
read, and even if someone eavesdropped and knows the encoding key, he is none the wiser 
because he does not know the decoding key. 
Until the 1970s, most crypto systems could be cracked. Of course, some were stronger than 
others, such as the coding machines used in the Second World War, but all turned out to be 
crackable in the end, if enough effort was put into it. But the new generation of crypto systems 
that emerged in the 1970s has turned out to be virtually uncrackable, no matter how much effort 
you take. (This is in theory, at least; in practice, implementations and use of secure crypto 
systems often turn out to have flaws.) It is a matter of computing power: to crack a message, you 
have to try every possible key, and it takes literally ages before you are likely to find the right 
one. Naturally computers get stronger every day, but it is easy to encode with a slightly longer 
key to more than compensate for this. Compared with traditional codes, then, modern automated 
codes are more or less uncrackable. It is a difference of degree, not a fundamental difference, but 
the difference of degree is so big that it has indeed altered the field. 
 
The difference between the old and new cryptographic ‘code’ has created a controversy that only 
recently seems to have calmed down into a status quo. Governments traditionally have not 
worried much that people could use cryptography; only the government knew the most 
sophisticated coding schemes, and what people encoded, the government could usually decode. 
With modern cryptography, that is no longer the case. People can use robust cryptography and the 
police – in theory – stands empty-handed: wiretaps and computer searches are useless if all they 
find is code.  
The controversy this has created is twofold, related to two different roles of government: 
protecting national security (see section 3.2) and enforcing the law.87 This latter part of the 
 
86 See, e.g., EPIC’s FOIA activities at <http://www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore/>.  
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controversy, related to domestic crypto use, is more complex than the first, which primarily deals 
with export controls. It was only in the early 1990s that governments realized that law 
enforcement could be seriously hampered by cryptography.88 Conceptually, there are two possible 
solutions to address this. You can either create mechanisms that ensure that the government has 
access to decoding keys beforehand, e.g., by having people deposit keys somewhere when they 
want to use cryptography, or by mechanisms that ensure access to keys afterwards, e.g., by a 
legal power that enables the police to force someone to give a decryption key in case of a crime.  
The U.S. government was one of the first to try the first approach. In 1993, they launched the 
Clipper chip, a chip for telephone encryption with a built-in backdoor for government access.89
They hoped that if enough people would voluntarily use this chip, the crypto problem would 
remain manageable (the police would simply notice when someone used non-Clipper encryption, 
and this would be interesting information in itself).  
The U.S. were not the only country to try to curb cryptography’s progress. In the Netherlands, in 
1994, a draft law was considered to virtually ban crypto use, except for those who would be lucky 
enough to get a license; after large public outcry, the idea was hastily abandoned. Still, the Dutch 
government for a long time afterwards thought of schemes that resembled the Clipper chip. If 
Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) offer confidentiality services (e.g., to provide customers with crypto 
keys for encoding data), they might be forced to facilitate “legal access”. In a “partnership 
approach” of government and industry, a project on Legal Access (Rechtmatige toegang) was 
established, which was to make sure the government could have access to crypto keys without 
obstructing industry too much. The outcome of the project, however, was that an economic-effect 
analysis showed that mandatory “legal access” is not economically feasible, since in that case, 
TTPs will move abroad; hence, the government refrained from further steps in this direction.  
Similar developments took place in the UK, where the government launched one consultation 
document after the other with proposals for government backdoor access to encoded data. First, 
such systems were proposed to be mandatory, but later, the government said they could be 
 
87 See Bert-Jaap Koops, Crypto Law Survey, version 22.3 (January 2005), <http://law.uvt.nl/koops/cryptolaw/>, for 
an overview of states’ initiatives in crypto legislation. The examples that follow can be found, with references, on 
this website.  
88 It must be remarked here that this still appears to be a mainly theoretical problem. There still is not really a law-
enforcement problem with cryptography (yet), even though it has been predicted ever since 1993 that law 
enforcement would soon become a joke because of cryptography. So far, few criminal cases appear to have been 
blocked by cryptography. Few public data are available; Dorothy Denning & William Baugh, Hiding Crimes in 
Cyberspace (July 1999), <http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/crypto/hiding1.doc>, have researched 
numerous crypto cases related to searches, the majority of which were not stopped by encryption. The 2002 
Wiretap Report of the U.S. Courts mentions that ‘Encryption was reported to have been encountered in 16 wiretaps 
terminated in 2002 (...); however, in none of these cases was encryption reported to have prevented law 
enforcement officials from obtaining the plain text of communications intercepted’, 
<http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap02/2002wttxt.pdf>. 
Our impression is that only since one or two years, at least in the Netherlands, does the police really encounter 
encryption that cannot easily be cracked in any significant number of cases. Perhaps, in the future, crypto use by 
criminals may therefore indeed become a real-life problem.  
89 Many documents concerning Clipper and its aftermath can be found in Lance J. Hoffman (ed.), Building in Big 
Brother. The Cryptographic Policy Debate. New York: Springer (1995), and Bruce Schneier & David Banisar, The 
Electronic Privacy Papers, New York etc.: John Wiley & Sons (1997).  
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voluntary.90 In Germany, part of the government also favored an approach of mandatory 
backdoor-access schemes, but other government parts opposed this.91 France, which was the only 
country in the Western world that had had strong domestic controls on cryptography at all, 
actually enacted a law in 1996 to regulate backdoor access: if people deposited their crypto keys 
with a government agency, they could get a license for strong cryptography.92 
Interestingly enough, governments were not the only ones to think about and devise backdoor 
schemes. Cryptographers themselves were active in the field, researching ways to build into the 
technology backdoor government access, or, alternatively, ways to circumvent backdoor access in 
schemes devised by others. For example, a study group from Royal Holloway University, 
London, developed a key-escrow scheme for international communications that would allow 
national government authorities to decrypt without having to resort to mutual assistance by the 
foreign country. They also included options for sophisticating their scheme: splitting keys to 
distribute among several TTPs, and changing keys regularly, so that, e.g., time limits on wiretap 
warrants might be technically enforced.93
The extent to which cryptographers went to try and incorporate norms into technology, can be 
illustrated by a paper by Bellare and Rivest. They apparently considered it a problem that there is 
no middle way between wiretapping (which overhears all conversations) and not wiretapping 
(which overhears none). To provide such a middle way, Bellare and Rivest proposed ‘translucent 
cryptography’.94 This is not opaque, in that encrypted communications are entirely unreadable for 
law enforcement, nor is it transparent, which means that law enforcement cannot read everything 
they intercept either. Rather, the system allows law enforcement to read a fraction p of encrypted 
intercepts – where p is a number between 0 and 1. The amount of translucency, in their proposal, 
is to be established by parliament. This fraction p could vary with applications; for instance, 
whereas for domestic communications, parliament might set p equal to 0.2 (allowing a relatively 
high level of privacy), they might require p to be 1 for international communications, or at least 
for communications with rogue states. Parliament could decide to change the fraction if the 
situation changes significantly, either because some terrible crimes involving cryptography have 
happened, or because elections were held and parties have promised their voters to set p to a 
particular value. This, at least, is the world view emerging from the technical paper. The point of 
this example is not that it is a realistic proposal, but that it shows the extent to which some code 
developers go to devise code that can incorporate norms – in this case, norms to be set by 
parliament. 
Nevertheless, however much governments and cryptographers may have thought they could solve 
the problem of criminal crypto use with this approach, it all came to nothing. By the late 1990s, 
 
90 Department of Trade and Industry, Paper on regulatory intent concerning use of encryption on public networks,
June 1996; Licensing of Trusted Third Parties for the Provision of Encryption Services, March 1997; Building 
Confidence in Electronic Commerce, March 1999.  
91 See a summary on Koops 2005, supra, note 87, and several documents on 
<http://www.kuner.com/data/crypto/crypto.html>. 
92 Loi no 96-659 du 26 juillet 1996 de réglementation des télécommunications, Journal Officiel 27 July 1996.  
93 N. Jefferies, C. Mitchell & C. Walker, A Proposed Architecture for Trusted Third Party Services, In: 
Cryptography: Policy and Algorithms, Proceedings of the conference: Springer-Verlag (LNCS 1029) (1996), 98-
104. 
94 M. Bellare, & R.L. Rivest, Translucent Cryptography. An Alternative to Key Escrow, and its Implementation via 
Fractional Oblivious Transfer (1996), <http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/BellareRivest-translucent.ps>.  
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backdoor-access schemes were out: Clipper had died a silent death,95 the Dutch, UK, and German 
governments thought better of it, and France abandoned the 1996 law and liberalized crypto use 
in 199996. There were several reasons for this. U.S. citizens did not trust the government with 
backdoor access, and even the U.S. government itself failed to use the Clipper chip. Technically, 
the backdoor schemes were tricky, not having proved themselves secure enough to be considered 
reliable. Most importantly, the schemes would not serve their purpose of preventing criminals to 
use encryption: serious and organized criminals would always have easy access to non-backdoor 
cryptography, and if necessary, they could use superencryption (first encrypt with a private, 
uncrackable system, then encrypt with the government backdoor system) to escape notice. And 
even if non-backdoor crypto were outlawed, few criminals would mind; they would just break 
another law (and one that was hardly enforceable anyway). With corporate and non-habitual 
criminals, the backdoor schemes might have had some effect, but for the kinds of criminals that 
the governments really wanted to target, the backdoor schemes were ineffective. 
Then what? In recent years, many governments have chosen the second approach. They have 
enacted laws that allow the police to command people to decrypt or to hand over their crypto 
keys. The Netherlands was the first to do so, in 1993.97 More recently, the UK, Belgium, France, 
and a host of other countries have followed.98 Thus, instead of relying on ‘code’ to incorporate 
law-enforcement access, they have settled for a merely legal solution in the form of an 
investigation power: if the police encounter encoded data, they can command decryption.  
The upshot is that cryptography is and remains a privacy-enhancing technology, which citizens 
can use to protect themselves against governments. It does not appear to be in very wide use, 
however: it is built-in in numerous software and infrastructure elements, but end users rarely use 
encryption themselves. The lack of use may be explained partly by the – perceived – difficulty of 
the technology, but also partly by the government campaigns of the 1990s against cryptography, 
not least by the export controls that effectively hampered law-abiding citizens and businesses to 
adopt strong cryptography on a large scale. Regulation in this case seems to have had an impact, 
not – as in the case of interceptability – on technology itself, but on the use of a privacy-
enhancing ‘code’.  
Balance 
Technology appears to be a key driver in enabling law enforcement to pry deeper into the 
personal sphere, often invisibly from a safe distance. The balance with privacy of new 
investigation powers is supposedly made time and again by the legislature and the courts, but 
 
95 Colleen O’Hara & Heather Harreld, DOD sinks the Clipper, Federal Computer, Week 17 (February 1997). 
96 Décret no 99-200 du 17 mars 1999 définissant les catégories de moyens et de prestations de cryptologie dispensées 
de toute formalité préalable; Décret no 99-199 du 17 mars 1999 définissant les catégories de moyens et de 
prestations de cryptologie pour lesquelles la procédure de déclaration préalable est substituée à celle 
d’autorisation.
97 Article 125k para. 2 Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering), inserted by the Computer 
Crime Act (Wet computercriminaliteit), Staatsblad 1993, 33.  
98 Part III of the UK Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000; article 88quater Belgian Code of Criminal 
Procedure (Wet van 28 november 2000 inzake informaticacriminaliteit / Loi du 28 Novembre relative à la 
criminalité informatique, Staatsblad / Moniteur Belge 2001 – 298); title IV French Code of Criminal Procedure 
(Loi no 2001-1062 du 15 novembre 2001 relative à la sécurité quotidienne). See further, e.g., the entries on 
Australia, Ireland, Trinidad & Tobago, India, Malaysia, and Singapore in Koops 2005, supra, note 87; the latter 
three have only limited scope. 
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because technology is developing, so does the reasonable expectation of privacy surrounding this 
technology. After all, there is less expectation of privacy when surfing the Internet than when 
watching television in your home, or when walking streets that have clearly visible 24-hour 
camera surveillance. Likewise, the case of location data99 suggests that somewhere in the perhaps 
not too far-away future, people’s movements may also lose the reasonableness of privacy 
expectations, since localization is becoming an increasingly common side-effect of technology: ‘a 
by-product of (...) technologies is the traffic data flow that is generated through usage, which 
records the individual’s movements, actions, and behavior’.100 
It may therefore be argued that ‘code’ is changing the traditional balance of privacy and law 
enforcement. This regards all kinds of domains: in the physical sphere, privacy is threatened as 
the home becomes intelligent and connected to the Internet through domotics, and as electronic 
monitoring allows the police to see through walls and curtains. Relational privacy is put under 
pressure as personal relationships depend vitally on telecommunications that may be wiretapped 
but that may also be sweepingly monitored with speech and voice recognition, and that are 
increasingly being subjected to data retention. And informational privacy is disappearing when 
the police can request all electronically processed data on any subject from any data processor, 
and can merge databases to find hidden patterns and connections.  
However, it should be observed that this development is not caused so much by ‘code’, i.e., 
technology with explicit privacy-infringing features built-in, as by technology in general. Privacy 
infringement happens to be a side-effect of technology development per se. The case of 
interceptability is an exception in this respect; it seems the only example in the list of 
developments sketched above that consciously built-in ‘privacy infringement’. Still, conscious or 
not, the effect on privacy is practically the same: slow erosion.  
 
Does ‘code’ do something about this shifting balance itself? That is, are privacy-enhancing 
technologies somehow counterbalancing the privacy-threatening technologies in this field? To 
some extent, that may be the case. Cryptography is a prime example of a technology that enables 
people to keep communications and written thoughts hidden from government surveillance. 
Steganography may also hide the fact of communication itself: post a picture of a red Toyota to a 
newsgroup with a message hidden in it that only your partner in crime will recognize. 
Anonymizers enable Internet activities with less chance of being traced. Sunglasses will help to 
thwart face recognition, and a Faraday cage will make your home an impenetrable castle for 
electronic spies. Many examples like these can be given of technologies that help to counteract 
invasive technologies.  
Nevertheless, our impression is that the privacy-threatening code is more developed and in wider 
use than the privacy-enhancing code. One of the reasons for this is that citizens are responsible 
themselves to use protective technologies, and they usually have no reason – and often not the 
knowledge and awareness – to put themselves to considerable costs and effort to build a 
technological shield against government intrusion. Law enforcement, on the other hand, has a 
 
99 See infra, section 3.2. 
100 Michael Levi & David S. Wall, Technologies, Security, and Privacy in the Post-9/11 European Information 
Society, 31 Journal of Law and Society (2004), 194-220, at 211. 
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major incentive to use the intrusive technologies, and this may explain why privacy-threatening 
technologies are developed sooner and used more widely than privacy-enhancing technologies. 
Of the examples given, only cryptography seems a PET that has really gained a definite foothold, 
if not with the general public, than at least with technology-aware citizens and criminals. But as 
the case of cryptography shows, governments have not been really happy with privacy 
technologies, precisely for the reason that they hamper law enforcement. And although crypto-
curbing laws and proposals seem to have died a slow death, as soon as a high-profile child murder 
or terrorist case emerges in which cryptography blocks finding the culprit, legislatures may be 
quick to yield to the pressure of law enforcement and pass a law that intends to restrict the use of 
cryptography. This is not to say that legislatures will not consider the balance between privacy 
and law enforcement in such a case, but it suggests that the interest of law enforcement is often 
considered so important that privacy-friendly technologies will not be readily supported by 
governments, even if they do not outlaw them in a single sweep of legislative zeal prompted by a 
high-profile incident. The bottom-line seems to be that law enforcement always trumps privacy.  
3.2 National Security 
The interest of national security is closely related to that of law enforcement, and we therefore do 
not go into great detail here. Nevertheless, there is one significant difference worth mentioning. 
Protecting national security is by its nature closely intertwined with secrecy and stealth. 
Investigation by security agencies is never as overt as law enforcement may be; it thrives only on 
covert intrusion techniques. This makes privacy-threatening ‘code’ all the more relevant to the 
field of national security: it is precisely covert surveillance that has received a boost through the 
technology development over the past decades. Global eavesdropping on an unprecedented scale 
through Echelon, satellite photography that – in military applications – will soon become 
sophisticated enough to notice intimate details of individuals on earth (e.g., sunbathers on a 
deserted stretch of beach), thermal imagers, and ‘smart dust’101 are but a few examples of the 
increased potential for covert intelligence. We describe two areas that illustrate the various ways 
in which this increase occurs. 
Case 1: Location Data 
One example of the ever increasing potential for information gathering is the booming area of 
location data. This is not specific to national security – we might equally well have treated it 
under the heading of law enforcement or commerce – but it is certainly an area where security 
agencies will benefit in ways we do not yet fully grasp. 
Technically, localization is closely related to two technologies.102 The first is mobile telephony, 
where network-based systems can locate a mobile phone, or cell phone. The network ‘knows’ in 
which cell a phone is located, but not precisely where in the cell. However, as the granularity of 
the cells varies in size from a few hundred meters in city centers to tens of kilometers in sparsely 
populated areas, the precision with which the phone’s location can be determined also ranges 
 
101 See supra, note 78. 
102 See ‘Wireless Location Privacy: Law and Policy in the U.S., EU and Japan’, ISOC Briefing #15, November 2003, 
<http://www.isoc.org/briefings/015/index.shtml>, for a brief but illuminating description of the technologies. 
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accordingly. This means that the precision is fairly precise at best. But there are ways to enhance 
localization to a scale of several to tens of meters, for instance, by triangulation using the speed 
and angle with which a mobile phone enters or leaves a cell and comparing signals received by 
various cells at the same time. Such refinements are being developed and installed in order to 
provide location-based services (see below).  
The second technology is the Global Positioning System (GPS). This is a system of US. owned 
satellites, initially launched and still in use for defense purposes, but increasingly also used in 
civil applications, that enable a handheld device to determine its location through the time and its 
position relative to three or more satellites. This enables localization with a precision of around 
ten meters; presumably, defense devices may reach a higher precision of around one meter. 
Contrary to the network-based location systems, the satellite network does not ‘know’ where the 
device is, since it is the device itself that computes its location. Nevertheless, through 
combination with a mobile phone or wireless radio transmitter (in a GPS ‘transceiver’), or with a 
disk and program that stores co-ordinates every minute (a GPS recorder), GPS can also give 
information about the location to third parties.103 
As David Phillips has shown, there are at least three major drivers behind emerging ‘wireless 
telecommunication systems’ that ‘incorporate surveillance capacity, particularly the capacity to 
track and record individuals’ locations’.104 The first – and for the U.S. perhaps the most important 
– is emergency response systems, that can now benefit from location data from a caller’s mobile 
phone to immediately track where the phone call – and presumable the emergency – comes from 
and, through combination with digital maps and routes, the fastest way to get there. The FCC has, 
through the Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, established ‘Emergency 
911’, requiring wireless operators to guarantee a high percentage of localization. It is up to the 
operators whether they want to ensure this through network-based localization or GPS.105 
The second driver behind location technologies is the business interest in location-based services 
(LBS). These are services based on fairly precise location data, within a range of several to tens 
of meters. Knowing exactly where potential customers are is immensely attractive for enterprises: 
it opens up opportunities for on-the-spot advertising (‘coming up on your right is a Wendy’s – 
veggie burger for only $ .99!’) and information services (you call a national weather line and 
receive the local forecast). It also enables companies to track and control employees (‘Why did 
you stay at the local pub for forty minutes?’) or simply to enhance efficiency, e.g., of taxi and 
shipping companies. A particularly interested sector is the automobile industry: car-navigation 
systems are booming, literally telling drivers how to get wherever they want to go; road-toll 
systems might efficiently compute tolls without cars having to slowly pass toll stations; rental-car 
companies can check speeding or driving on forbidden mud tracks; and car owners feel safer if 
the car is locatable in case of a car-jack. In fact, a major application seems to be parents’ 
 
103 Apart from these major technologies associated with mobile communications, it should be noted that other 
technologies may also increasingly provide location information. An example is RFID tags (see section 3.4), which 
might for instance lead to information about a person’s – or that person’s clothes, shoes, or bag – entering or 
leaving a shop being stored in a database.  
104 J. David Phillips, Beyond Privacy: Confronting Locational Surveillance in Wireless Communication, 8
Communications Law & Policy (2003), 1-23. 
105 Id., at 3-5. See 64 Fed.Reg. 60, 126. See also, more extensively, David Phillips, ‘Texas 9-1-1: Emergency 
Telecommunications and the Genesis of Surveillance Infrastructure’ (forthcoming).  
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providing their children with location-indicating technology in order to safeguard against 
kidnapping.106
Thus, the third location-technology driver is surveillance. Law-enforcement and national-security 
agencies are interested in location information of mobile phone calls. Telecom operators are 
required to make available to these agencies the location of the cells in which phone calls took 
place.107 It is true that this has not driven the development of technology as much as the first two 
drivers – government surveillance has merely followed existing technological developments here. 
Nevertheless, there is a certain driving force in its own here, particularly if mandatory data 
retention is enacted and made applicable to mobile location data.108
Now why is this important for national security? Security and intelligence agencies will benefit 
immensely from the host of detailed location information that is slowly but inevitably becoming 
available about persons. They already receive cell-site location data from mobile telephones when 
they order operators to produce traffic data. More importantly, once more applications and 
services will be based on precise network-based localization or on GPS transceivers, agencies 
may order more data from those who process the location data, or perhaps they may even 
intercept them wirelessly in some ways. Moreover, such data may be combined with other data, 
for instance, retrieved location data may lead to a CCTV tape that shows an image of the person 
phoning in the supermarket or at the gas station. Also, it is not inconceivable that, just as 
localization in ‘emergency 911’ (E911) has been mandated, obligatory location tracking for 
national-security purposes will be established as well.  
Perhaps more immediately relevant will be the active localization that national-security agencies 
can use. GPS recorders or transceivers can be attached to vehicles and boxes, and as they grow 
smaller, also to suitcases or clothes. Law enforcement has already used a GPS recorder 
successfully to track a murder suspect’s truck movements to the grave where he reburied his 
victims.109 This differs from a traditional direction transponder, in that there is no need to follow 
the item itself, which always entails the risk of discovery; one can simply afterwards check the 
route followed by retrieving the device and reading the recorded GPS data.  
To sum up, this case shows that technology enables increasing, systematic, and covert 
localization of individuals. Security agencies join in and profit from the market and E911 
developments – just as law-enforcement agencies and businesses will benefit from location 
technologies. It is not unlikely that this may be reinforced by legal requirements for government-
surveillance purposes, demanding storage and production of location data in a variety of cases. 
The associated privacy shift is significant, since localization is possible on much wider scale, and 
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also can be executed post ipso facto by retrieving stored location information. This substantially 
impacts the reasonable expectation of privacy that people have traditionally had in movement: 
they may have been visible at a certain time at a certain place, but much less traceable for a 
longer period of time. The continuous localization offered by current and future technologies thus 
significantly contributes to the ‘disappearance of disappearance’ that is a defining characteristic 
of the information age.110 
Case 2: Cryptography revisited 
In the case of cryptography discussed in the previous section, we mentioned that national security 
is perturbed by cryptography, mainly because if foreigners use it, eavesdropping becomes useless. 
This has given rise to export controls in many countries. During the Cold War, agreements were 
made within the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) to curb the 
export of cryptography. In 1995, this was followed up by the Wassenaar Arrangement, an 
international (non-binding) instrument of 33 countries that regulates the export of weapons and 
dual-use goods (that is, goods that have both a military and a civil application); cryptography is 
such a dual-use good. The thrust of the arrangement is to allow only export of weak (easily 
crackable) cryptography and to require licenses for export of strong cryptography. As the 1990s 
evolved, the controls were increasingly controversial, especially in the U.S., since they hampered 
electronic commerce and were practically unenforceable, given that strong crypto programs could 
be downloaded from many places on the Internet. After several relaxations, in the U.S. and in the 
Wassenaar regulations, the controversy seems to have calmed down in the new millennium; 
apparently, the licensing procedures are sufficiently smooth nowadays not to really obstruct 
international (e-)commerce anymore. Of course, the effectiveness of remaining export controls is 
low: if foreign crooks and criminals want to obtain strong cryptography, they can download 
reliable and free programs from various countries through the Internet.  
But there is more. In the ‘law-enforcement’ case description (supra), we asserted that 
cryptography has retained its foothold as a privacy-enhancing technology. But this is not entirely 
true. Even here, a suspicion cannot be altogether discarded that backdoors are built in. It is true 
that the idea of building-in mandatory backdoors for government access has utterly failed, but this 
regards the protocols and standards. We can be fairly sure that crypto systems, such as the 
Advanced Encryption Standard, are reliable and do only what they are supposed to do, because 
the protocols have been published and scrutinized extensively. However, for implementations and 
concrete products, this may be different. The story of Crypto AG is disillusioning: 
‘For decades, the US has routinely intercepted and deciphered top secret encrypted messages of 
120 countries. These nations had bought the world’s most sophisticated and supposedly secure 
commercial encryption technology from Crypto AG, a Swiss company that staked its reputation 
and the security concerns of its clients on its neutrality. (...) All the while, because of a secret 
agreement between the National Security Agency (NSA) and Crypto AG, they might as well have 
been hand delivering the message to Washington. Their Crypto AG machines had been rigged so 
that when customers used them, the random encryption key could be automatically and 
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clandestinely transmitted with the enciphered message. NSA analysts could read the message 
traffic as easily as they could the morning newspaper.’111
This is not to suggest that every crypto product is bugged, but the story should make us wary of 
trusting privacy-enhancing products at first sight.  
Balance 
The cases show that, even more than is the case with law enforcement, ‘code’ is threatening the 
existing balance between privacy and national security interests. And since the activities and 
technologies of security agencies are much less published than those from law enforcement, there 
is even less incentive for people to protect themselves with privacy-enhancing technologies. 
Thus, particularly in the area of national security, ‘code’ favors a significant shift of the balance 
to the detriment of privacy, a push that can only be checked by legislatures and courts in a 
conscious attempt to retain privacy at a certain level. Since 9/11, however, such a conscious 
attempt is anathema, and national-security interests ride along with technology to diminish 
citizens’ reasonable expectations of privacy.  
In these domains, the principal value to be protected clearly seems to be security at the cost of a 
whole range of competing other values, dignity, self-evaluation, and protected communication 
being prominent victims. Interestingly, a value that ordinarily favors giving up one’s private 
sphere, namely cost, is also affected. The measures taken to increase security are costly and are 
likely to only increase in the future.112 
3.3 E-Government 
We started this article with a discussion of Bentham’s Panopticon, the ultimate way of 
government to spy on and control their citizens. Whereas this image may be an appropriate one in 
the light of developments with respect to national security as described in the previous section, e-
government shows us a different face of government. Here it is not so much Big Brother who 
monitors its citizens, but instead we are guarded and looked after by Soft Sister,113 although Soft 
Sister may turn out not to be so soft after all, as we shall see.  
Since the mid-1990s, governments have adopted the notion of electronic government, following 
the advances of e-commerce. In U.S. vice-president Al Gore’s re-engineering government 
through IT program114, the two hitherto deemed opposing forces, efficiency and consumerism, 
were connected, and they have since dominated the development of e-government. An important 
result of the e-government venture seems to be that improving service delivery for citizens and 
improving efficiency in the public sector prevail over information privacy protection.115 
111 Wayne Madsen, Crypto AG: The NSA’s Trojan Whore?, Covert Action Quarterly 63 (January 1999).  
112 The aforementioned EU proposal on data retention (see note 108) is highly critized, partly on the basis of the 
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114 Office of the Vice President, Reengineeering government through IT, Washington DC: Government Printing Office 
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In the rise of e-government, citizens are more and more seen as customers who deserve levels of 
service delivery comparable to those in the private sector.116 Service delivery should be simpler, 
more efficient, and more customer-friendly. IT, and especially the Internet, is a means to 
accomplish these goals. Central concepts in the e-government development are online service 
delivery and integrated service delivery through one-stop shops. The former allows citizens to 
apply for services, such as permits or grants through the internet. The latter means that problems 
are addressed in a holistic manner: instead of having to go from agency to agency a citizen can 
apply for several related services at a single location, both offline and online.  
The Internet, and closed networks, have a huge potential impact on the privacy of citizens in the 
public sphere, because they allow the fiction we call ‘government’ to become reality. 
Government in most countries is composed of a multitude of agencies of varying size, each of 
them responsible for a particular set of tasks with corresponding responsibilities. And they all 
keep their own records to carry out their daily operations.117 The Social Welfare agency, for 
instance, has to have records to provide citizens on welfare their monthly benefit. They have to 
keep track of who is entitled to what amount of benefit, what is paid and when, etc. It is safe to 
say that almost all records in public offices are computer databases nowadays. And, as agencies 
increasingly are wired-up, also their databases can be combined – both to offer services online, 
and to offer the holistic services heralded by the e-government rhetoric. The wiring-up of 
previously separated databases also leads to data exchange between agencies and also to 
combining data into new information. Goals of improving government efficiency and improving 
service delivery to citizens introduce pressure to do just that: combine information sources across 
agencies.  
Both government and citizens benefit from this scheme at first, citizens even in a double sense: 
efficiency gains may lead to lower taxes, and better service delivery may lead to more satisfied 
customers. Efficiency gains for government derive from the fact that information is entered once 
and reused at multiple locations. The cost of obtaining data decreases and the overall accuracy of 
the data can be higher than in the case of each agency collecting its own data. 
To illustrate what the combination of personal data in the context of e-government purports, we 
describe two cases. 
Case 1: Pro-active service delivery 
The benefits for the citizen derive from the fact that once the identity of this citizen is known to 
the wired government, the various databases can be used to determine their legal position with 
respect to rights and obligations, at least to some extent. For instance, the entitlement to a rental 
benefit can be established by combining income data (available to the tax authorities) with data 
on rent paid by the applicant (available to the housing corporation, which in some cases is a 
public agency, at least in the Netherlands). Information from the various government databases 
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can therefore be used to pre-populate (online) forms or even to make decisions on the basis of the 
data already available, without a need for citizens to apply for these services altogether. This 
latter type of service delivery is called pro-active service delivery118 and shows precisely what is 
meant by the soft-sister concept mentioned earlier: government taking active care of its citizens 
by combining the available information on citizens and to determine their rights (and obligations) 
and taking action on these without waiting for the citizens to call for these actions. This 
paternalistic notion may appeal to some and is part of government policy in at least some 
countries, such as the Netherlands. In ‘Contract with the future’, a Dutch policy paper in which 
pro-active service delivery is adopted as Dutch policy, the primary reasons for doing so are 
mentioned: ‘Services are improved, there is an increased take-up of previously unused services 
and legal equality increases, as do effectiveness and efficiency’.119 
The idea of combining databases in the sense described above made national headlines in the 
Netherlands at the end of 1997, when the city of Groningen announced that it was going to use 
combined databases to locate citizens entitled to various services for people with insufficient 
means. Various studies in the early 1990s had shown that considerable numbers of people entitled 
to these benefits and subsidies fail to apply for them.120 The initial experiments carried out in 
Groningen and a number of other cities121 have shown that combining data from different data 
sources can indeed help to locate people entitled to certain benefits, although the effectiveness 
varies. Local services gained more than nationally available ones. This is not unsurprising as the 
national services are better known to the public than local services.122 
The experiences with combining data sources in Groningen and elsewhere in the Netherlands 
have spurred the take up of pro-active service delivery in the Netherlands, and it was adopted as 
one of the pillars of Dutch e-Government in 2000.123 
E-government has matured since 2000 and more advanced examples of pro-active service 
delivery can be witnessed at various places. A recent study commissioned by the European 
Commission discusses a number of them in their report on best practices in back-office 
integration in Europe.124 Common themes where we see examples of pro-active service delivery 
on the basis of data interoperability are child allowances (in for instance Ireland and Spain) and 
tax filing (e.g. Finland and Spain). Child allowance is triggered by birth notifications received by 
the civil registration service. The process is partially automated in the case of a first child/claim. 
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In this case the parents receive a partially filled out form. In the case of subsequent 
children/claims there is no need for form filling at all, and payments start automatically after the 
birth notification has been received by the responsible agency.125 
Millard et al note that: ‘In each of the countries (Finland, Ireland and Spain) from which the 
above cases are taken, there have been few, if any, problems with data privacy, either because of 
legal restrictions or objections by the citizen. Such conditions do not obtain in all European 
countries, which makes the offer of pro-active services much more problematic there.’126 
However, the examples described so far only concern a very limited number of databases and 
agencies involved; child allowance is triggered by a birth notification form the civil registry, for 
instance. It is not difficult to imagine more and more agencies and registers to become involved 
in this type of service delivery, leading to an increasing amount of personal data to become 
‘connected’. And this will certainly affect privacy. 
The Dutch city of Enschede provides an example of what is to come with respect to linking 
databases concerning individual citizens in pro-active service delivery in their project ‘my 
counter’.127 Once the citizen has identified himself to the city online, the system provides 
personalized advice and news. The user is, for instance, notified on the progress of his 
applications, the expiry of passport and driver’s license, but also information on road works and 
town planning in the user’s immediate neighborhood can be provided. This type of personalized 
services is customary in the commercial domain, where it is part of customer relationship 
management (CRM). The Enschede example shows the use of multiple databases, residing at 
different municipal agencies. The potential privacy impact may surpass that in the private sector 
as it may impact on rights and obligations of citizens (see next case). 
The effects of data exchange for the benefit of pro-active service delivery not only arise as a 
result of the actual combination of data previously unassociated, but also because it acts as a 
catalyst for even more exchange. Access to information in databases can be provided on the basis 
of many attributes associated to a person (e.g., name or address). In practice, however, 
identification numbers are frequently used for this purpose. A reason for using identification 
numbers instead of, for instance, one’s name, is that they are concise and do not have variants. 
Names and addresses can be written in many different ways; this is not only the case with 
‘foreign’ names containing diacritics, but also ordinary names give rise to different spellings: 
omission of middle initials, additions to names, maiden names, et cetera. The advantage of using 
identification numbers is even bigger when data sources have to be combined. Here the process of 
matching of records in the various tables on the basis of names and/or addresses produces many 
mismatches and non-matches due to the variations. 
As a consequence there is a tendency to use a single unique identification number for a large 
variety, if not all government databases. This tendency can be illustrated by recent developments 
in the Dutch medical sector. In 2002, the Dutch Data Protection Authority (College Bescherming 
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identification numbers instead of a single identification number for all government databases.128 
This scheme allows for inherently better data protection than the use of a single identification 
number, since it prevents unnecessary merging of data bases. The policy has in principle been 
embraced by the Dutch government129 and the medical sector advised to adopt a sectoral Care 
Identification Number (Zorg Identificatie Nummer, ZIN) for each citizen. However, a study on 
the costs this would create for health-care insurance companies and health-care providers now 
seems to tilt the balance towards adopting instead the generic Citizen Service Number 
(BurgerServiceNummer, BSN) that is currently being developed as an overarching government 
ID number.130 Efficiency is therefore a primary reason not to diversify identification systems.  
Case 2: Using citizen data for secondary purposes 
In the previous case we discussed data interoperability for the benefit of citizens. The same 
mechanisms can also be used against citizens. Combating fraud is an example of the use of data 
interchange that easily springs to mind. In the Netherlands, for instance data is exchanged 
between the local General Assistance Offices (GSD), the Office for  Employee Insurrances 
(UWV), the Tax Authorities (Belastingdienst), and  the Information Management Group (IB-
Groep), by means of a gateway  maintained by the Intelligence Agency (Inlichtingenbureau) in 
order to  combat fraud with General Assistance benefits. 
But also in the case of legitimate citizen behavior, data exchange can be used against the citizen. 
The reliance on single cross-sector identification numbers facilitates ‘cross-fertilization’ of 
services. For example, data bases on hospitalization might be merged with other data bases in 
order to make profiles of people that have a high ‘hospital risk’; insurance companies might 
subsequently use such profiles to diversify insurance costs. Although we are not aware of serious 
forms of ‘cross-fertilizing’ of government services at present, the software that enables the 
merging of data exists, and thus at least in theory allows the creation of new policy instruments. 
For instance, you only receive a rental allowance if you have paid all your fines. Or, your 
monthly social-security benefit is decreased if you drive a car and have taken a plane twice in a 
year (thus polluting the environment more than the average citizen). And, your request for a 
building permit is processed with priority if you have submitted your tax income in time over the 
past five years. There may be some citizens who appreciate such schemes, but others will feel 
threatened by government agencies knowing details of their lives that they do not need to know to 
do their proper job. 
 
Also, misuse of data sources is facilitated by the developments sketched. Interrelated government 
data bases allow, for instance, social-security providing agencies to see whether someone has yet 
to pay a speed-driving ticket, or the tax authorities to check how often someone has entered a 
prison to visit an inmate. This is not only a theoretical threat. At present, police officers already 
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consult vehicle registration information for personal use131 and social welfare employees are 
known to have used data for other purposes than social welfare. These malpractices relate to 
individual databases, but there is no reason to assume it will not happen when the data sources 
become even richer by cross-linking; on the contrary, the enlargement of both the data bases’ 
scope and the people who have access to them increase the risk of ‘interesting excursions’ and 
misuse.  
Balance 
Within the public sector, ‘code’ is affecting the balance between privacy and what ‘the 
government’ knows of its citizens. In the case of e-government the problem is not so much the 
government prying deeper into the private sphere by collecting data that was previously 
unavailable. Instead, the problem is the combination of data already available to government, 
albeit to distinct organizations and agencies. Whereas the citizen used to present only a fragment 
of himself to a particular government agency, the agency in question increasingly is capable of 
recollecting the citizens’ other fragments as well by linking up with other government agencies.  
The principal driving forces that lead to increasingly transparent citizens are efficiency gains for 
both government and citizen, greater convenience for the citizen132, but also increasing equality 
before the law as preventing or fighting fraud can be seen as a way to give everyone his rightful 
share. In a sense, one can even argue that also privacy values, such as individuality and integrity,
the desire to be seen as an individual person and not to be flattened out, can be said to be served 
by the data interoperability, since it allows more aspects of the citizen to be taken into account in 
delivering services. However, on balance, one has to acknowledge that citizens become more 
transparent as a result of pro-active service delivery and the associated integration and 
interoperability of data sources. The modernization of government, embodied in the aims to 
improve efficiency and service delivery, seems to prevail over privacy interests.133 
It is unclear whether citizens care a lot for the loss of their privacy; regardless of that, it is an 
interesting question whether it is really necessary to affect the privacy of citizens in the way it is 
done at present in achieving the goals as set out. Is it possible to deliver pro-active services, 
increase efficiency, and improve convenience without invading in people’s private spheres more 
than before? The answer to this question, according to some, is yes. A balance between privacy-
protection interests and efficiency and service-delivery improvements can be maintained.134 What 
they propose is maintaining a balance by implementing ‘privacy by design’, implementing 
privacy protection in code by adopting PETs and by maintaining data walls between sectors. 
Applications can be constructed in such a way that only the necessary minimum of information is 
revealed. For instance, for offering a housing benefit, the responsible agency need not know the 
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income of a citizen, they only need to request the tax department to report whether or not the 
citizen’s income is below the relevant threshold. This is an application of the PET notion, as 
introduced by the Dutch and Ontarian Data Protection Authorities135: construct technology in 
such a way that the minimum amount of data necessary for the specific goal is used, and shield-
off all other information. 
 
But why do such alternatives to sacrificing privacy for the improvement of efficiency and service 
delivery not seem to be used in practice? This may well be unintentional. Maybe it is more a case 
of unawareness or lack of appreciation of the privacy-enhancing possibilities of technology. And 
also, the cost of implementing proper privacy-protecting ‘code’ may be deemed too high. Policy 
makers and systems developers are hardly aware of the alternatives to personalized access to 
services. 
It is too easily assumed that giving access to citizen data within the government is essential to 
improve service delivery. For instance, it is usually taken for granted that the government should 
know the identity of the citizen to perform any task or service. But this is often not the case. For 
example, when a neighborhood planning committee collects comments from citizens through a 
website, it will usually collect names and addresses of the participants to be able to check whether 
only people with a genuine interest in the neighborhood participate. If there is a requirement of 
only being permitted to participate in the online hearing when one actually lives in the 
neighborhood, then one could use other, less privacy-invasive, checks as well. The check on 
neighborhood residency can be done by another agency than the one running the online hearing. 
Technology can facilitate such privacy-friendly verification in numerous ways, depending on the 
desired level of security, from anonymous or pseudonymous smart cards with biometrics handed 
out by a municipality to each citizen, to merely publishing a generic access code in the local 
newspaper. 
Indeed, biometrics is a technology that may be used in a non-identifying way, by allowing 
compartmented access to relevant characteristics of a person stored on a smart card. In practice, 
however, biometrics is usually viewed only as a technology for identification, and it is used in a 
privacy-threatening rather than a privacy-enhancing way. 
 
3.4 Commerce 
Electronic commerce is somewhat similar to e-government, in that the central idea is doing 
traditional things in new, electronic ways, with kindred interests of efficiency and serviceability. 
Added, however, are commercial interests: businesses have a significant interest in collecting data 
about customers, their habits, and their interests, since these can be used to target current or 
potential customers in a more effective, personalized way. Moreover, e-mail addresses and 
profiles are increasingly being treated as commodities in themselves, leading to multiple and 
largely invisible streams of personal-data traffic across the world. Numerous ‘code’ developments 
facilitate this collection, use, and spread of personal data in the context of e-commerce, from 
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having people fill out web forms with personal data, to more covert techniques such as cookies 
and spyware, and from merging databases with profiles to transaction monitoring to create new 
information.  
Although the nature of such activities is nothing new compared to what happened in traditional 
brick-and-mortar business, the scale and ease of processing personal data have increased 
significantly enough to warrant the statement that the balance is tipping in the direction of 
commercial interests to the detriment of informational privacy. This entails various risks, such as 
the denying of goods or services to consumers with a ‘wrong’ profile, or showing higher prices 
on a website based on a ‘high-risk’ profile, or allowing only customers with a ‘right’ profile to 
pay afterwards; and this happens regardless of whether the individual in the zip-code area indeed 
has a low income. Moreover, personalized commercial communications may give the consumer 
the eerie feeling that ‘this company knows everything about me’. Or consumers may feel 
offended when they search for something and the website shows them related goods or services 
(when you look for Hiroshige prints, the web page prompts: ‘persons who bought this book also 
enjoy reading ‘Erotic Japanese Woodcuts’, showing an image of the eroticizing cover). Although 
the privacy-related harm in such cases does not seem very great, in certain circumstances, the 
effects of businesses knowing more about the consumers than is necessary for particular, solicited 
transactions, can be grave, particularly when someone has many characteristics of uninteresting 
or high-risk groups and when no alternative ways are left to conduct business in a more privacy-
friendly way. 
 
In the following cases we illustrate the ways in which technology nibbles at data protection of 
citizens, and how sometimes, commercial uses of data are also adopted by the government. 
Case 1: Transaction Monitoring in Mobile Telephony and Banking136 
Carrying out transactions, and especially electronic transactions, generates data. This is also true 
for the mobile telephony and banking industries. Mobile telephone operators, for instance, 
obviously need to know the phone numbers of both caller and recipient to establish a connection. 
They also need to keep track of the call’s duration for billing purposes as most phone operators 
use time base billing. Similarly, banks need to know the account numbers of payers and payees as 
well as the amounts of transfers when money is transferred between accounts or when money is 
deposited or withdrawn. So, the main reason for collecting transaction data is the proper 
functioning of transaction systems themselves. 
However, transaction data may also be used for secondary purposes. Suspects in a Dutch high-
profile child murder case were, for instance, located in Spain following a cash withdrawal from a 
cash dispenser.137 
Transaction data generated during mobile phone calls or financial transactions may also be used 
to build profiles of the behavior of individual customers. Since about 2000, monitoring systems 
have been available to do just that. Some mobile phone system operators use this type of 
 
136 This section is based on Antonius Adrianus Petrus Schudelaro, Electronic payment systems and money laundering 
risks and countermeasures in the post-internet hype era, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers (2003). 
137 <http://rtl.nl/(/actueel/rtlnieuws/)/components/actueel/rtlnieuws/12_december/19/buitenland/rowena.xml>.  
38
electronic monitoring to detect theft, payment fraud, and identity fraud. The monitoring software 
builds and maintains individual customer profiles and notices radical changes in customer’s 
behavioral pattern. When a mobile phone is stolen or lost and later used by someone else than the 
owner, this will be noted by the monitoring system. The new user is likely to produce a calling 
pattern that is completely different from the owner’s (the victim) pattern. The profiles can also be 
used to notice defaulters. When a customers fails to pay his bills (defaults), he will ultimately be 
disconnected from the service. If the defaulter were to reapply for the service and be accepted, for 
instance, because of the use of a false name, the monitoring system would recognize this 
customer’s behavioral patterns as one of a known defaulter. The phone numbers used and also the 
general calling behavior will match. Consequently, the service could then be discontinued again. 
Applications of behavioral monitoring, such as fraud detection but also the detection of 
commercial opportunities, are also important in the financial world. Electronic monitoring is 
used, for instance, during customer acceptance and credit-scoring procedures. By analyzing 
various types of data, providers of financial services can, on the one hand, assess the commercial 
potential of a future customer. On the other hand, data analyses can also be used to assess 
whether acceptance of a potential customer is likely to result in a bad debt or whether there are 
other grounds for rejecting an applicant. Additionally, behavioral monitoring is also used after 
applicants have been accepted. Once transactions have begun, behavioral monitoring can be used 
to detect behavior that exceeds certain predefined limits, or to make profiles of the behavior of 
individual customers based on the type, number, and frequency of the transactions they make, 
when, where, how, and with whom they make them, the amount of money involved, et cetera. All 
of these data can be linked to names and account numbers. The data obtained through this kind of 
transaction monitoring is not only valuable from a risk-assessment, fraud-detection, or 
commercial-opportunity point of view, but it can also be valuable for law-enforcement purposes: 
behavioral monitoring may be used, for instance, to detect and investigate money laundering.138 
Thus, we see in the mobile-phone and banking sectors the emergence of monitoring as an effect 
of technology developing in such a way that consumer data can be merged and analyzed; this 
enables close scrutiny of communications patterns and transaction behavior, which is used not 
only for fraud-prevention and fraud-detection purposes, but also for commercial purposes. As a 
side-effect, the government may step in and use the monitoring capability that has emerged in the 
private sector; they may even make data collection and monitoring mandatory for law-
enforcement purposes, to combat telecoms fraud and money laundering. 
Case 2: Tag, You’re It: RFID Will Get You139 
There has always been a need to be able to identify and trace products. For this reason, products 
carry manufacturer and product codes, and since the 1970s many products also carry the UPC 
(universal product code) or bar code number. Barcodes have to be read by optical scanners and 
hence have to be visible to the scanner. This limits the use of the technology. Using radio signals 
instead of optical scanning, alleviates the line-of-sight problem and also opens up new 
 
138 In many countries, the banks are required to report remarkable transactions to the tax authorities. 
139 Subtitle inspired by the title of a report by the Ontario privacy commissioner Cavoukian, Cavoukian 2004, supra,
note 76. 
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possibilities and uses for product tags. Recent advances in technology have made possible the 
production of Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) tags with very small footprints and low 
cost.  
An RFID system consists of a tag capable of transmitting, and sometimes receiving, information 
by means of radio signals. The radio signals can be picked up by a radio receiver for further 
processing. In comparison to optical scanning, reading RFID tags is quick: they can be read at 7 
items a second. Another clear advantage over optical tags is the fact they can be read even if they 
are covered by fog, snow, paint, or cardboard. 
RFID tags come in various flavors.140 Some tags carry chips that can hold a larger amount of data 
and can process data (encryption, verification); they may even contain sensors (to measure 
temperature, for instance). Chipless tags offer less capabilities as they lack a microcprocessor (the 
chip) capable of processing and storing data. These chipless tags can store a more limited amount 
of data (typically 24 bits) and they are cheaper to produce than chip-carrying tags. Another 
distinction relates to the power source driving the tag. Passive tags are activated and powered by 
the reader, with a limited range to about 10 meters. The advantage of these tags is that they do not 
need their own power source that can run out of power, and hence they can operate indefinitely, 
at least in theory. Active tags contain a power source and an active transmitter capable of sending 
the signal over a larger distance (up to several kilometers). Passive tags are smaller and cheaper 
to produce than active tags. They are usually read-only tags that can not be changed after 
production time. More expensive tags can be changed, or written to, after production.  
The price of passive tags at present is in the order of € 0,15-0,50 for quantities of 100,000. This 
means that at present, they are not suitable for cheap mass consumer products. Prices are 
expected to drop to less than $ 0.05 a piece.141 This would make them suitable to replace barcodes 
on most products and enter the supermarkets with possibly far reaching consequences for both 
suppliers and consumers. 
 
RFID tags carry a number, and as such, open opportunities to associate meaningful data to the 
item carrying the tag. The tag’s ID in itself may contain information, such as the producer, 
product type, size, color, production date, and toxicity. But it can also contain a unique 
identification code. Together these types of data in the tags open up vast possibilities to relate 
information to the tag. In its simple form only the meaningful data on the tag is used. The 
information can be used to provide location information in, for instance, supply chains or 
buildings, or for billing purposes at the counter. The specific data about the tagged item, such as 
color, size, and production date, may be used by, for instance, washing machines (‘Are you sure 
you want to wash this purple sock together with your white laundry?’) or fridges (‘You had better 
finish your milk, which is nearing its best-before date’).  
When the data in the tags are associated with external data (stored in databases), the possibilities 
to track and trace items increases even more. The history of Individual items can easily be stored 
and maintained throughout the life cycle of the tag. This could of course also be done with other 
 
140 See Cavoukian 2004, supra, note 76 for an overview. 
141 MIT, The New Network: Identify Any Object Anywhere Automatically, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Auto-ID Center, 
2002. 
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types of tags, such as bar codes, but RFID data is easier to read, both in the amount, as well as in 
effort; reading a bar code with 256 characters takes more effort than reading these from an RFID 
tag. 
 
Current applications are relatively limited in scale due to the cost of present tags. But there are 
also many plans to implement tags in large numbers. Esso (SpeedPass) and Shell (EasyPay), for 
instance, use RFID tags in payment systems. SpeedPass users have a key tag incorporating an 
RFID tag that allows them to pay for their gas without using cash or credit card.142 Many 
organizations, such as Tilburg University, have personal RFID cards for access to the office 
buildings. More practical for forgetful workers is the chipping of Mexican Ministry of Justice 
employees to access secure rooms in the Ministry.143 Household pets and cattle are tagged with 
RFID tags embedded in glass tubes for identification purposes. For cattle, they could replace the 
yellow ear-tags currently used for cattle in the Netherlands. A number of large seaport operators 
are installing tags on the containers they process.144 Employees in the harbors are also equipped 
with tags, allowing a detailed log of who has been involved with particular containers. In 
Alexandria Hospital in Singapore, every patient, visitor and staff member was issued an RFID 
card after the SARS outbreak in the spring of 2003.145 This allowed all movements of people 
within the hospital to be traced. In the event of a new SARS victim, this information could be 
used to quickly establish with whom the victim has had contact.146 Delta airlines is testing RFID 
tags attached to baggage to make tracking and tracing of luggage easier. In the UK, car license 
plates may be equipped with RFID to automatically identify cars passing by with speeds of up to 
320 km/h from up to 100 meters away.147 
Large supermarket and retail chains are interested in using RFID tags on their goods because it 
will allow them to streamline the supply chain. Boxes with items can be inspected without a need 
to open them, and ‘smart shelves’ are envisioned to signal staff they need replenishing. The 
American Wal-Mart chain, who was also a main driving force in introducing the barcode in 1984, 
intends to introduce RFID tags in conjunction with its top-100 suppliers in 2005. In the UK, the 
Tesco chain started a pilot project in a store in Cambridge. Gillette, Wal-Mart and Tesco co-
operate in the RFID experiments. Prada shoes has plans to implement RFID tags. They have also 
piloted RFID closets in some of their New York stores that responds to the garment taken into the 
dressing room. An interactive touch screen ‘enables the customer to select alternative sizes, 
colors, fabrics, and styles, or see the garment worn on the PRADA catwalk as slow-motion video 
clips’.148 Bennetton and Marks & Spencer in the UK have announced plans to incorporate tags in 
clothing. At the Tokyo International Bookfair 2003, a system was demonstrated that allows 
 
142 John Wolff, RFID Tags - An intelligent Bar Code Replacement, IBM Global Services (2001). 




146 In theory, this kind of tagging could also enable finding patient ‘zero’, the patient who first shows the symptoms of 
a disease. 
147 <http://www.rfidnews.org/news/2004/06/10/rfidenabled-license-plates-to-identify-uk-vehicles/>.  
148 <http://www.ideo.com/case_studies/prada.asp?x=5>. 
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detailed in-store observation of people browsing books and magazines. “By placing tag readers 
on the shelves of bookstores, the new system allows booksellers to gain information such as the 
range of books a shopper has browsed, how many times a particular title was picked up and even 
the length of time spent flipping through each book.”149 Moreover, the European Central Bank 
considers embedding hair-thin RFID tags in euro notes, in order to combat counterfeiting, black-
market transactions and money laundering.  
 
A final application of radiofrequency identification chips is for labeling people. The American 
company Applied Digital Solutions is marketing chips (VeriChip) which can be implanted into 
humans. These chips were at first coined as a means to keep track of children. If a person carrying 
such a chip goes missing or is abducted, chip-reading devices can be placed in the search area in 
an effort to track down the missing person. But other uses are soon found. The Baja Beach Club 
(with venues in Rotterdam and Barcelona) offers their members the option to have a VeriChip 
implanted for € 25 to replace the traditional membership card. The embedded chip offers their 
carrier the guarantee that they do not have to queue, get reserved tables, and, most importantly, it 
allows them to order drinks to be put on their tab. ‘The bartender simply pings you with a 
handheld scanner’.150 What the chip carriers probably do not realize is that they can also be 
‘pinged’ outside of the Baja Beach Club, perhaps by a local pub owner who dislikes Baja Beach 
braggers and refuses them entry, or by the local police officer interested in how much the Club 
member has drunk. 
 
The current applications are fairly straightforward and do not tilt the privacy balance too much. 
Objects can be identified by reading their tag and hence their location can be established, or 
action can be undertaken on the basis of the identity. But looking further in the future uses can be 
foreseen that at one time cross the border of proportional use. 
An obvious use of RFID tags is personalization of services. Objects and information displays may 
offer personalized responses and information, depending on the tag that is in its vicinity. Razors 
and electric toothbrushes could trigger intelligent mirrors, that is, mirrors equipped with a display, 
to provide specific training or use instructions. Shopping windows can have displays that show 
personalized information and discounts on the basis of tags worn by a passer-by.151 In museums, 
audio and visual information provided by the various objects can be tailored to the person 
watching the object. The RFID tags in euro notes to counter forgery, black-market transactions, 
and blackmailing may also be read by law-enforcement agencies to search for fraudulent or stolen 
money – but also by criminals interested in scanning wallets to find the right wallet to pickpocket. 
 
Radio tags can have a long lifespan, as passive tags can be read long after they have served their 
intended purpose. Price tags on products, for instance, can therefore be read after the client leaves 
 
149 Newspaper report in the Nikkei Electronics News, mentioned in CASPIAN and others, RFID Position Statement of 
Consumer Privacy and Civil Liberties Organizations (2003), <http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/RFIDposition.htm>.  
150 <http://www.thefeature.com/article?articleid=100662&ref=1208370>. 
151 An already famous example is the scene in the movie Minority Report, where John Anderton (Tom Cruise) passes 
shop windows that not only show commercials, but also personally address passers-by to draw their attention: ‘John 
Anderton, you look like you could use a Guiness’. Recognition in this case is done by a retinal scan, but RFID 
could be used just as well. 
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a shop. The widespread use of RFID tags can thus easily lead to profiling and monitoring. 
Corporations, but also governments, can keep track of people by following the tags they wear or 
carry. Since tags can have an individual identification code, tracing individuals is possible. 
Moreover, combining data on the various tags carried by a person allows for sophisticated 
monitoring of lifestyles and habits. For instance, someone entering a Shell station with a car 
equipped with Michelin tires, wearing Prada shoes and clothing and paying with her EasyPay 
card, leaves a trace by both her shoes and her car tires. If this information is combined with 
purchases in shops, she runs the risk of becoming completely transparent. The purchases at Prada 
that could have been done anonymously by paying in cash, in this case end up not to be 
anonymous as the EasyPay card gives away the customer’s identity, if they are linked by willing 
retailers. And this may occur without her being aware of it: for one thing, people will rarely note 
the tags, and if they do, they will tend to regard them as just another barcode, not realizing the 
tracking potential that RFID tags have.  
Thus, the use of RFID tags may seriously impact informational privacy.152 Data from the tags can 
be collected without the carriers’ explicit consent, and even possibly without them being aware of 
the tag’s existence. Invasion into people’s personal lives is even greater if identity papers such as 
passports and driver’s licenses are tagged, or if RFID tags like the VeriChip are implanted. This 
allows for constant tracking of people. A news item in CNet, gave a preview of people tracking: 
‘Delegates to the recent Communist Party Congress were required to wear an RFID badge 
equipped with the tiny tag, which permitted their movements around the conference to be 
constantly tracked and recorded.’153 
Opposition to the use of radio tags is rising from both privacy watchdogs, such as the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC), the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, and European Digital Rights (EDRi), and from consumer organizations, 
individual consumers, and recently also politicians154. As a result of the fierce opposition, many 
forerunners of RFID use – Bennetton, Wal-Mart, Prada, and Gillette among them – have 
retracted, or at least changed, their plans. Nevertheless, we think it is inescapable that tags are 
increasingly used in products, because the benefits for commerce will be simply too great. The 




RFID tags can, as we have seen, pose serious threats to a person’s informational privacy, and also 
allow a person or object’s location to be traced. But resistance is not futile. There are various 
 
152 See, for instance, CASPIAN and others 2003, supra, note 149; Gal Eschet, A New Challenge to Privacy 
Management: Adapting Fair Information Practices to Radio Frequency Identification Technology (May 2004), 
SSRN, <http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=557441>; Nissenbaum 2004, supra, note 63, at 135: ‘RFID 
tags (...) significantly alter the nature and distribution patterns of information.’ 
153 <http://news.com.com/2009-1088-984352.html?tag=fd_rndm#38>. 
154 See, among others, CASPIAN and others 2003, supra, note 149. Californian senator Debra Brown has proposed 
legislation to require persons or entities that use RFID tags to comply with certain conditions, such as an obligation 
to get an individual’s written consent before collecting RFID data and the obligation to destroy or incapacitate the 
tags once a customer leaves a shop (California sb 834 bill 20040220). 
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ways in which RFID tags can be disabled. First of all, the tags can be destroyed physically, for 
instance by smashing the tag or by ‘cooking’ them in a microwave oven, which destroys the chip 
by overloading the circuitry with high-energy radio waves. But also, since RFID tags use radio 
signals to communicate with tag readers, traditional radio jamming can be used to disrupt data 
communication between tag and reader. And finally, the tags can be shielded by metal foil to 
prevent radio waves from entering or leaving the tag.  
Also intelligent forms of misleading the readers are under development. RSA Security is 
experimenting with ‘Blocker Tags’. These tags can selectively (e.g., only the range of tag id’s 
assigned to Prada shoes) or universally block RFID tags from being read by sending out 
fabricated data. The blocker tags, if embedded in, for instance, a shopping bag, provide a 
designated privacy zone: if the item is inside the bag, it cannot be read, but if it is removed, it can 
be read.155 
Another way to disable RFID tags is by deactivating the tags when they have served their 
purpose. The MIT Auto-ID Center has proposed to include a ‘kill switch’ into the RFID 
specifications.156 A number of RFID manufacturers, such as Philips Semiconductors have 
announced they will do so.157 Chips that implement the kill switch can be disabled on checkout by 
the reader if the customer requests so. A requirement in that scenario, of course, is that the 
customer is aware of the tag and its risks; and even then, he may not be fully assured that the tag 
is actually disabled or may not be switched on again.  
Balance 
As in the case of e-government, technology facilitates large-scale information collection as well 
as information shielding, but tends by itself to favor only the former. The case of transaction 
monitoring eminently illustrates the power of IT to combine data. Through its use for fraud-
detection, it is being widely employed, and, as a side-effect, may also serve other purposes, such 
as marketing or law enforcement. RFID in fact, even though it is not yet as widely developed as 
transaction monitoring, shows similar aspects: it offers a host of information and data trails, 
which can be primarily created for specific purposes – for instance, streamlining supply chains, 
controlling access, personalization of services – but which may subsequently be put to various 
other uses. RFID also illustrates the natural tendency of technology to create and spread data 
rather than contain them158: only after substantial protests from civil society has industry become 
aware of potential privacy threats and looked for ways to contain these.  
Privacy-enhancing technologies can be used to curb data collection, such as anonymizers, cookie 
crunchers, RFID blockers, and anti-spyware tools, but consumers have to make an effort (and 
certain costs) to protect their privacy with these tools and techniques. Moreover, often they are 
not aware of the covert data collection that is taking place in (e-)commerce, and they do not 
bother to use PETs. And although it is conceivable that privacy-enhancing ‘code’ is built-in more 
 
155 A. Juels, R.L. Rivest & M. Szydlo, The Blocker Tag: Selective Blocking of RFID Tags for Consumer Privacy, In: 
8th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, edited by V Atluri: ACM Press (2003) 103-111. 
156 Cavoukian 2004, supra, note 76. 
157 <http://blog.digitalidworld.com/archives/000433.html>. 
158 Or, to (mis)use part of the slogan attributed to Steward Brand: “Information wants to be free”, in Whole Earth 
Review (May 1985), at 49. 
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in infrastructures and services, so far, little progress seems to be made in that area. The interests 
at stake, cost, convenience, preventing/monitoring fraud, simply seem to favor privacy-
threatening technology much more than privacy-friendly ‘code’.  
4 The Effects of ‘Code’ on Privacy 
What picture emerges from the tour d’horizon of ‘code’-influenced privacy? There is a clear 
common thread in all of the domains that we analyzed. Privacy-related norms are rarely explicitly 
built-in in technology. As such, a Lessigish privacy ‘code’ or a Reidenbergian Lex Informatica 
Vitae Privatae does not exist. Technology, in particular software and the Internet architecture, 
rarely incorporates specific privacy-related norms. The few existing exceptions concern building-
in an option of privacy violation, such as interceptability of telecommunications.  
At the same time, however, technology very often does have clear effects on privacy. Technology 
affects the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’, it partly shapes what can be deemed ‘necessary in 
a democratic society’ when it comes to deciding what privacy violations are acceptable. In the 
vast majority of technologies that are developed and used in real life, this influence is to the 
detriment of privacy. That is, technology often has the side-effect of making privacy violations 
easier. Particularly information technology turns out to be a technology of control. Although at a 
theoretical level, it also is a technology of freedom, in practice, it rarely functions as such. 
Privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) have been devised and propagated, but they have yet to 
be implemented on any serious scale.  
This conclusion holds both for the public and for the private domain. As the examples in law 
enforcement and e-government show, technology offers increasing opportunities for large-scale 
monitoring – from intercepting all telecommunications (and there is a lot of telecommunications 
nowadays) to monitoring the movements of people. Also in the private sector, technology enables 
more and more control of people, from workplace and transaction monitoring to personalization 
of consumer relationships, with new applications such as facial recognition and RFID monitoring 
looming ahead.  
This is understandable. One of the prime attributes of information and communications 
technology is that it enables sharing of information rather than shielding or compartmentalizing 
information. And the people who usually decide on how technology is applied are precisely the 
people on the strong side of power relations – governments, businesses, employers –, who have 
an interest in gathering information about the people on the other side, so that they can maintain 
or expand their power basis.  
This is not to say that people in power always consciously exploit technology for control 
purposes, but it does mean that there is little incentive to look deep into the effects of new 
technologies for privacy. If some more control is possible by a new application, well, that is not 
what the application was made for, but it is fine nonetheless. People gladly adopt the new 
possibilities. In fact, after a lapse of time, one gets so used to this new control mechanism, that it 
may be no longer perceived as a side-effect, but as an intrinsic – and perhaps intended – 
characteristic of the technology. This is when the ‘reasonableness’ of a privacy expectation is 
shifting: once the new technology is accepted as being inherently control-friendly, there no longer 
is a reasonable expectation that this control is not exerted. At that point, since control is also a 
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primary interest to governments in their law-and-order role, the control characteristic may also be 
mandated by law. Non-interceptable telecommunications is forbidden, because the police have 
got so used to intercepting telecommunications that a large part of their work is based on this 
method. Identification is made obligatory, because government employees feel they simply have 
to know the identity of citizens in order to be able to do their job.  
The eroding effect of technology on privacy is thus a slow, hardly perceptible process. There is 
no precise stage at which one can stab a finger at technology to accuse it of unreasonably tilting 
the balance of privacy. Exactly because of the flexible, fluid nature of what is deemed privacy, 
society gradually adapts to new technologies and the privacy expectations that go with it. If one is 
to stop this almost natural process, a conscious effort and considerable resources are called for.  
5 Evaluation of ‘Code’ and Privacy 
We now return to the initial question that triggered this research: how does ‘code’ relate to 
privacy? How should we perceive the notion of ‘code as law’ when it comes to privacy 
regulation? We turn to several questions that relate to the legitimacy of ‘code’ as law.159 
1. Can rules be distinguished in the code? 
Only rarely does code include specific privacy-related rules. One example is interceptability of 
telecommunications, in which the ‘rule’ is built-in that the government must have an option of 
intercepting telecommunications if they want to. Other examples are PETs, such as anonymizers 
and RFID blockers; here, the ‘rule’ is that one must be able to use technology in an anonymous, 
unsupervised way. Even though such norms are not legal rules in the sense of ‘Thou shalt not 
kill’, one can see them as expressing rights: everyone has the right to anonymity; the government 
has the right to intercept. It is stretching things a bit to see them as constituting these rights 
themselves, though – rather, they are enforcement mechanisms of such rights.  
In the vast majority of technologies, however, there are no privacy-related ‘rules’. The technology 
just often happens to facilitate control, but this is not a consciously built-in characteristic that 
could count as a rule. 
Nevertheless, one might want to qualify this conclusion. It is true that rules are not consciously 
embedded, but given the scale and seriousness of the privacy-threatening side-effects, one could 
view privacy-curbing ‘rules’ as being negligently built-in in technology. Code developers, 
marketeers, and policy-makers usually, through what Froomkin terms ‘privacy myopia’,160 seem 
to disregard the negative side-effects of technology for privacy, resulting in substantial erosion of 
privacy. Hence, they may be thought to fail to ‘exercise the standard of care that a reasonably 
prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation’ and thus perhaps to commit ‘any 
conduct that falls below the legal standard established to protect others against unreasonable risk 
of harm’, as a definition of negligence terms it.161 In other words, they are responsible 
nonetheless for building in privacy erosion in technology.  
 
159 For an elaboration of these questions, see the Chapter by Lodewijk Asscher, in Asscher 2005, supra, note 1. 
160 Froomkin 2000, supra, note 8,  at 1501.  
161 Bryan A. Garner (ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary: West Group (2000).  
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Although this is perhaps stretching the term ‘rule’ rather far, we incline to think that the 
development and application of code that negligently fails to take privacy effects into account can 
indeed be seen as the embedding of a ‘rule’ in the technology, namely that privacy is unimportant 
and secondary to other values that the code primarily serves. Such technology does indeed serve 
to guide or control (what is perceived as) proper and acceptable behavior, since it considers 
privacy-infringement an acceptable outcome of the ways in which it is used.  
 
2. Can the rules be understood, i.e., is it understandable how code works and what it does? If so, 
are those rules transparent, are they accessible to the general public? Can the rules be trusted, is 
there any guarantee that rules are not changed during the game? Are code rules reliable in the 
sense that they are predictable? 
These questions into the transparency and reliability of ‘code’ can be answered straightforwardly 
with respect to the ‘negligently’ built-in value of privacy erosion: this is not transparent, 
trustworthy, or reliable in the sense that people know the ‘rule’ and that they can trust it to ‘work 
properly’. After all, it is a negative rule, a lack of privacy-awareness, and this void is not 
transparent. 
With ‘intentional’ code, the answer may be more subtle. Government-mandated ‘code’ that 
enforces control, such as interceptability, tends to be obscure; this might invite changing the rules 
along the way, in the development process or afterwards in ‘updating’ technology. The debates in 
the U.S. over CALEA and the wide interpretation the government gave to the interceptability 
requirement, might be seen as an example of a fear that what would actually be built-in in the 
telecommunications infrastructure was more than mere interceptability. The culture of secrecy 
triggers the fear that the built-in rule – interceptability – functions differently, that is, in an even 
more privacy-threatening way. One might say that ‘code’ in its guise of government-mandated 
control rules is inherently unreliable: unless law enforcement and national security replace 
secrecy with openness and open source, there will always remain a hint of suspicion, justified or 
not, that technology does more than what the government says it does. But also on issues less 
dramatic than national security, electronic voting for instance, we can not at all be sure that 
government does not monitor the individual voter’s preferences162, unless open source software is 
used.163 
With PETs, this is not the case. Precisely because they are developed to protect privacy by people 
who are usually ardent defenders of privacy, there is less risk that the built-in rule – you can be 
anonymous, you can do this without being monitored – is actually changed. Yet this is not 
absolute, as the story of NSA-induced backdoors in Crypto AG’s cryptography products suggests. 
We do not believe developers of privacy-enhancing technologies are being routinely infiltrated or 
convinced by security agents to build in backdoors. However, given the covert nature and the 
large interests of national security, particularly in the current post-9/11 climate, one cannot 
altogether dismiss a fear that even PET products produced by privacy-minded people, particularly 
robust ones that thwart any kind of control, are being covertly altered.  
 
162 Nor can we be sure that our actual vote is what is counted by voting machines.  
163 See for a list of issues in the recent US presidential elections <http://www.epic.org/privacy/voting/>. 
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3. Are ‘code’ rules contradictory? Do they pose a logical or at least consistent system of 
regulation? Do ‘code’ rules require the impossible? 
In a way, one might view government-mandated privacy-infringing ‘code’ as contradictory with 
PET ‘code’. After all, they have opposing goals, and a technology with a built-in option for 
privacy infringement clashes with a technology that has privacy protection built-in. They function 
more or less as an arms race, with PETs reacting to overintrusive surveillance technologies, and 
privacy-infringeable ‘code’ being developed to counteract the threat to governments of 
uncrackable PETs. This neatly mirrors the precarious balancing act of privacy, which is 
continuously being tugged at by the interests on both sides of the balance.  
Still, this does not need to be the definitive answer. PETs are interesting precisely because they 
can incorporate shades of privacy protection. The concept of PET is not so much that it protects 
privacy absolutely, but that it enhances the protection of privacy, and usually in such a way that it 
does not unreasonably restrict other interests at stake. Often, one can develop technology in such 
a way that privacy is not unnecessarily threatened while the technology still achieves its primary 
goal. Particularly the domains of e-government and commerce lend themselves well to such 
PETs: one can easily do business with the government and with enterprises without offering the 
most intimate details of one’s private life.164 The privacy-threatening side-effect of technology 
and ‘negligent code’ can be curbed to a considerable extent by such PETs. And so, ‘code’ can 
offer – in theory, at least – a consistent system of regulation by allowing degrees of privacy 
protection: privacy when possible, infringement when necessary.  
 
4. Is there a sovereign? An authority that makes the ‘code’ rules? 
The main authority that makes ‘code’ rules are code developers, who through negligence build in 
a slow erosion of privacy.165 However, since this is a process of which the developers are largely 
unaware, one can not really see them as an ‘authority’ in the sense of a rule-making body. 
Nevertheless, they may still be addressed about the rules they unwittingly or carelessly create 
with respect to privacy infringement.  
With government-mandated enforcement ‘code’, on the other hand, there is a clear sovereign: the 
government. If the built-in privacy infringeability is mandated by the legitimate legislator – 
parliaments and the like –, there is no specific ‘code’ problem of legitimacy. If parliament decides 
that all telecoms should be interceptable, then so be it. But if the ‘code’ should be built-in – hush-
hush – at the urge of government in its guise of national-security protector, there may be more 
cause for concern, given the intransparency and uncontrollability of such actions.  
For PETs, the relevant authority is the technology developer, operating perhaps at the urge of 
Data Protection Authorities and privacy lobbies, and sometimes at the urge of government (as in 
the case of Microsoft’s .Net passport).  
 
164 Developing these notions is one of the aims of the European Union 6th Framework Program, IST projects: 
“developing solutions for privacy-enhancing identity management for end users”, <http://www.prime-
project.eu.org/>. 
165 Cf. Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv Shah, Deconstructing Code, Yale Journal of Law & Technology (2004), 277-389, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=597543>, who distinguish between various kinds of code 
developers, arguing that ‘code developed by a university is likely to contain different values and biases, regarding 
societal concerns such as privacy, than code developed by a firm.’ 
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5. Is there a choice? Can consumers and citizens choose not to obey the rules? Can citizens and 
consumers freely choose another system of law/code? 
The choice issue is related to the question of consistency. Citizens cannot choose between 
interceptable and non-interceptable telecommunications, simply because the built-in 
interceptability has been made obligatory by law. But they can choose to use PETs when 
telecommunicating, counteracting the risk of interception. (Or – unpragmatically – they could 
also choose to use no telecommunications at all.) In principle, they can choose any array of 
technologies that fits their own privacy desires (supposing the PET does not secretly leak).  
In practice, however, the choice is more difficult. Choice implies awareness, and particularly with 
privacy, there is considerable lack of awareness among the general public of the potential 
(mis)uses of technologies; they can and will be used against you. Choice also implies 
affordability, and although anonymizers or RFID blockers do not cost millions of euros, they are 
not free either. More importantly, they are time-consuming and require a conscious effort to 
apply, as opposed to the one-click-does-it-all interface that people have gotten used to. There is 
yet another constraint. In doing business, be it with enterprises or the government, the technology 
is not consciously privacy-threatening but facilitates privacy infringements nonetheless. Hardly 
ever can one choose to use a PET in such situations. It is the provider of goods and service – 
business, government – who should implement a PET; if they do not, the citizen/consumer cannot 
herself decide to use PET: the system simply refuses anonymous communications, or requires 
you to fill in fields with personal data that, in principle, have nothing to do with the good or 
service at issue (why do they have to know you are female and the date you were born if you 
want to e-mail a question to a government through a web form?). In the commercial domain, one 
might look at the market to ensure choice nevertheless, some companies offering consumers 
privacy-friendly services; in the public domain, one can – so far – not choose between 
governments to conduct business with.  
 
6. Do ‘code’ rules conflict with or alter traditional legal norms? 
The ‘code’ rules seem at first sight in line with traditional legal norms. After all, they are 
developed precisely to enforce existing norms: interceptability and PETs are both examples of 
enforcement-enhancing technologies that safeguard accepted legal values: law enforcement and 
privacy protection.  
At second sight, one may be more critical, however. Enforcement may be built-in not only 
because it enforces a traditional legal norm, but also because it reinforces this norm. In other 
words, there is a mutual influence between legal norms and technology, particularly technologies 
of control. As noted above, if technological development facilitates more control, and once 
society gets used to this new technology, the step of mandating the control element in the 
technology may appear merely applying the law, but at the same time, it makes the law stronger 
than it ever was. This is because the element of rule-breaking is eliminated. Where formerly, 
people could, if they wanted to, circumvent control, even if the control was consistent with the 
law, with built-in enforcement there is no escaping control. In this way, ‘code’ that ‘applies’ 
existing legal norms at the same time makes the legal norm itself absolute.  
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Now, how does the notion of ‘code as law’ work overall when it comes to privacy regulation? 
First, with ‘code’ that negligently incorporates privacy erosion, there are serious problems. The 
incorporated ‘rule’ is intransparent; there is no clear mechanism for addressing the authors of 
such ‘rules’, since they are themselves hardly aware of them and neither are the policy-makers 
who could or should address them; and citizens and consumers hardly have a choice since there is 
insufficient supply of privacy-enhanced technologies.  
Second, where technology explicitly functions as ‘code’, in a handful of enforcement-enhancing 
technologies, such as tools of interceptable telecoms and PETs, one can also voice concern over 
some elements. Notably, the transparency of the ‘code’ and the non-circumventability can be 
perceived as problematic.  
6 What is the problem, exactly? 
Having surveyed and analyzed the relationship between ‘code’ and privacy, we have noted 
several problems associated with the embedding of privacy-related rules in technology, notably 
intransparency, the lack of mechanisms to address the ‘rule-makers’, and lack of choice. Thus, we 
turn to the third part of our research question: does ‘code’ cause shifts in privacy balances? 
 
It is useful to distinguish two issues at stake, which may require separate treatment. The first – 
and minor – issue is intentionally privacy-related ‘code’. Since only a minority of technologies 
consciously embed privacy enhancement or privacy infringement, this issue affects privacy 
regulation to a minor extent. Some things can be done to address flaws in the functioning of this 
‘code’ as privacy law, notably to enhance transparency and to deal with the uncircumventability 
that might too radically limit choice.  
But perhaps these problems should not be exaggerated. We are talking about a minor part of the 
gamut of technology as we use it today, making the fact that one has no choice but to use this 
specific privacy-related technology less consequential. And the ‘codes’ mentioned may be 
intransparent, because we cannot exclude national-security-urged backdoors being built-in, but 
then again, we can also not exclude the possibility that the world is teeming with Martians we just 
happen never to see because they are smart enough to stay invisible. And moreover, many 
traditional legal norms are not particularly transparent either. In short, in the relatively few cases 
in which privacy-related norms are built-in explicitly in technology, there are concerns of 
transparency and mandatory compliance, but these concerns may not differ radically from non-
’code’ forms of regulation, and we need perhaps not be gravely concerned that ‘code’ seriously 
alters existing privacy balances.  
 
This is different in the second, and larger, issue emerging from our analysis: the slow but gradual 
erosion of privacy that is a side-effect of much technological development and that can be seen as 
the negligent embedding of privacy infringement in code. The privacy balance clearly seems at 
stake here. Despite the fact that some scholars have pointed out this development as a potential 
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‘death of privacy’,166 the technology push of privacy erosion as such does not currently seem to 
be a serious academic and societal debate.167
One explanation for this could be that the gradual erosion of privacy is a natural process: as 
technology evolves, we gradually adapt ourselves to its possibilities, and while these possibilities 
stress information sharing and monitoring more than information shielding, the reasonable 
expectation of privacy is slowly being transformed as well.  
In fact, perhaps we should not ask ourselves what are the main problems with ‘code’ and privacy, 
but rather: what is the problem anyway? Michael Froomkin, acting as the devil’s advocate, has 
considered the possibility that we are dinosaurs, hopping around in a changing world where we 
do not see that other species with quite other world views will soon take over.168 Looking back 
and clinging on to privacy protection may be old-fashioned, when we observe youngsters 
massively leaving data trails on the Internet and chatting intimate details into mobile phones in 
public, without regard for potential privacy effects. Likewise, consumers seem almost too willing 
to sell personal data for small discounts, not bothering to ask to what uses the data are 
subsequently put. And although this argument can be countered by observing that large part of 
this development is fed through ignorance – most people simply do not know what is being 
recorded and what can be and is done to their data – this still begs the question how bad really the 
seeming loss of privacy is.  
In other words, are there real – or realistic – horror stories to show that things go terribly wrong if 
‘negligently privacy-threatening’ technology develops unheeded? It may be difficult, actually, to 
pinpoint concrete examples of ‘privacy horror’. Since privacy is a servant to many masters (see 
section 2.5), it is in fact other values that seem at stake. For instance, loss of privacy may in quite 
a few cases lead to discrimination, since individuals will be judged more on the sum of 
knowledge that people have about them, and also by group profiles of which they share 
characteristics – and thus will also be increasingly judged by on the basis of non-relevant bits of 
knowledge or presumed information.169 It also threatens values such as solidarity as enshrined in, 
among others, European societies, for example, when patients are judged by the knowledge of all 
their habits and predispositions, possibly leading to enormous insurance costs for people with 
‘bad’ lifestyles or ‘bad’ genes. Privacy loss in situations like electronic voting may be detrimental 
to the democratic value of elections. 
As these examples show, it is perhaps not specific individuals’ horror stories that underpin 
concern over privacy-eroding ‘code’, but rather the sum of situations in which individuals would 
experience loss of privacy. Central privacy-related values are at stake if, slowly but surely, 
multiple parts of daily life are becoming more transparent: an individual will feel harmed in her 
integrity because she feels less an individual, less autonomous, and less dignified when society 
treats her as a collection of information fragments rather than as an integral human being. Also, 
 
166 Froomkin 2000, supra, note 8 (note the question mark in the title). 
167 ‘Erosion of privacy’ has been debated in the 9/11 context and before, centering on the U.S. Patriot Act, the U.K. 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, and similar privacy-diminishing laws. However, the erosion of privacy as 
inherently facilitated by technology – the issue we are concerned with here – is not the topic of that debate.  
168 Michael Froomkin, in the workshop on ‘Code as law’ of 1-2 July 2004, held in Amsterdam.  
169 See Bart Custers, The Power of Knowledge. Ethical, Legal, and Technological Aspects of Data Mining and Group 
Profiling in Epidemiolog, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers (2004). 
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there is less scope for self-realization when there are ever less spheres and situations in which one 
can feel unobserved.  
Moreover, one must also take into account the effects of such ‘code’ for society as a whole. A 
transparent society where everybody may know everything about everybody else, or in which 
certain groups know everything about other groups, is quite a different kind of society than the 
essentially pluralistic and individualistic (Western) society of the early 21st century. Since society 
is continuously changing, this need not be a doom scenario – we simply do not know what such a 
society exactly is like – but we should be careful in embracing the prospect of such a world with 
the argument that it is the natural evolution of a technology-driven society.  
In this respect, we feel it is useful to have a glance at the precautionary principle that is a 
fundamental part of environmental law. This principle says that if full scientific certainty about 
the consequences for the environment of a particular activity is lacking, but if all other conditions 
for taking measures are fulfilled, these (environment-protecting) measures should be taken. A 
more progressive formulation of the principle determines that precautionary measures should be 
taken when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a particular activity has a detrimental 
effect on the environment.170 The comparison of privacy with the environment may be more apt 
than one might think at first sight: as Charles Sykes has observed: “Privacy is like oxygen. We 
really appreciate it only when it is gone”.171 Privacy, like the environment, is invisible, but very 
much a constitutive factor of the world we live in, and, again as is the case with the environment, 
erosion of privacy is usually irreversible. This means, in our opinion, that we should not give up 
privacy just like that, and that precautionary measures are called for until we know more about 
the consequences of irreversibly giving up privacy. 
7 Countering the Erosion of Privacy 
What could such precautionary measures be, to address the gradual erosion of privacy through 
technology?  
Lessig suggests two pillars of tilting the balance of privacy back again. One is commodification 
of personal data, that is, treating personal data as a commodity that the data subject owns, 
comparable to, for example, portrait rights marketed by celebrities.172 Such an approach might 
give people enough power over their personal data that the risks of data merging, profiling, 
exclusion, and the like can be countered. However, as Prins argues, this is ineffective: ‘Given 
that, to a large extent, individuals depend on the use of their data and that personal data are the 
motor of our information society, a move towards a legally recognized property right in personal 
data will in effect not change the free public availability and exchange of these data.’173 
Moreover, there are various other arguments to judge this approach ineffective; e.g., how can 
 
170 Jonathan Verschuuren, Principles of Environmental Law, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft (2003), at 56. 
Cf. Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, available at 
<http://www.unep.org>. Cf. also Tim O’Riordan et al. (eds.), Reinterpreting the Precautionary Principle, London: 
Cameron (2001), in particular Chapters 1 and 3.  
171 Sykes 1999, supra, note 9, at 2.  
172 Lessig 1999, supra, note 11. 
173 J.E.J. Prins, Property and Privacy: European Perspectives and the Commodification of our Identity, in: L. Guibault 
& P.B. Hugenholtz (eds.), The Future of the Public Domain in IP, The Hague etc., Kluwer Law International 
(2005). 
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someone control a piece of personal data, once it is sold and part of the opaque data-merging 
market? How could data subjects control their data when confronted with ‘take it or leave it’ 
contracts of powerful market parties? What will the administrative costs be of paying for use of 
personal data, perhaps on a royalty basis? And would such a system not require more processing 
of personal data in order to pay the data royalties? In short, this approach ultimately fails.174 
Could Lessig’s second pillar, Privacy-Enhancing Technologies, provide such an instrument? 
PETs, after all, are an instrument of control. As we have argued in the cases in the various 
domains, PETs by and large seem a pet of data protection commissioners and privacy lobbyists, 
but so far, they do not seem to get through to others. They remain a mainly theoretical solution 
that has yet to prove its effect in practice. We discern several reasons for this: technology by itself 
tends to combine and connect rather than to compartmentalize, information wants to be free 
rather than be shielded, and governments dislike technologies they cannot break to get 
information. Moreover, the people who need PETs are usually not the ones who can decide 
whether they are used. And even if they can, they are often not aware of the consequences that 
on-line (trans)actions have for their privacy, or they are not willing to invest extra effort and 
money in using PETs.  
Therefore, if PETs are to do the trick of keeping privacy alive, a conscious and concerted effort is 
needed. The market will not stimulate and use PETs by itself; in our view, it is clear that the 
government intervention is needed if privacy-enhancing ‘code’ is really to carry weight in 
stopping the gradual erosion of privacy. Sometimes, we get a glimpse of what such intervention 
may achieve, such as when Microsoft adapted its .Net passport system under European pressure. 
Another interesting, if rare, example is the Data Protection Act 2000 of the German state of 
Schleswig-Holstein, which applies to public bodies; §4 reads: ‘(1) The data-processing body shall 
observe the principle of data avoidance and data economy. (2) Preference shall be given to 
products whose conformity with the data protection and data security provisions have been 
established by means of a formal procedure. The State Government shall make orders regulating 
the content and format of the procedure and who is authorized to carry it out.’175 
What could a government PET action plan look like? First, governments should consistently 
evaluate, or have others evaluate, technology developments for their effects on privacy. Just as 
Dutch legislation requires an ‘environment impact statement’ to be made for, e.g., major 
construction activities, extraction of oil, and waste dumps, legislatures could impose an obligation 
to make a ‘privacy impact assessment’ in cases of new technologies being developed and 
marketed.  
Second, there should be more binding mechanisms to respect privacy when possible and to only 
infringe privacy when necessary. Although the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are 
enshrined in many privacy and data-protection laws, they do not appear to have much effect on 
the privacy risks of technology. As a corollary of a privacy impact assessment, a control 
 
174 See also Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, Stanford Law Review 52 (2000), 1283-1313; 
Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy-Control, and Fair 
Information Practices, Wisconsin Law Review (2000), 743-788. 
175 State Data Protection Act Schleswig-Holstein, 9 February 2000, available at 
<http://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/material/recht/ldsg-neu/ldsg-n_e.htm>.  
53
mechanism should be established that checks whether technologies are constructed in the most 
privacy-friendly way compatible with other requirements (such as information needs and 
security). We are not sure that this is entirely feasible, but it should be at least possible to uncover 
excesses and overintrusive technologies. The control mechanism should then also have some 
sanctioning power, e.g., a prohibition for the government to buy privacy-unfriendly technologies, 
or a power to fine companies that fail to make a privacy impact assessment or that market clearly 
privacy-unfriendly products.  
Third, and perhaps most importantly, a PET action plan should raise awareness, both of citizens 
and consumers and of enterprises, of government agencies as well as of technology developers. 
Raising awareness of privacy risks with citizens and consumers is in fact a crucial first step to 
stopping the downward spiral of privacy erosion that is partly a result of privacy myopia. Only if 
people are aware that there is a ‘death of privacy’ development and what this may mean for their 
future, can – perhaps – a sufficient amount of leverage be established that can start to check the 
natural privacy-eroding tendency of technology.  
 
